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Through many glasses darkly Sulla and the End of the Jugurthine War

Summary – In this essay we hope to focus attention on the way in which the sources, in particular Sallust, present the Mauretanian King Bocchus' surrender of his Numidian ally Jugurtha to the Roman officer L. Cornelius Sulla at the end of the Jugurthine War in 106 B. C. The incident occasioned wildly divergent treatments, as we hope to shew, in any number of historical pamphlets, and a visual depiction of it once became the subject of a political quarrel between Sulla and Marius. We hope below to explore the historiographical significance of this politically important event and feel that discussion of it will shed more light on Sallust's work as both historian and literary artist.

I. The Historiographical Background of Sallust's *Bellum Iugurthinum*

At various points in the *Bellum Iugurthinum* Sallust casts glances forward towards the civil wars of the 80s B. C. Thus we read of C. Marius that *postea ambitione praeceps datus est*, “afterwards he was carried away headlong by his hankering after popularity”.¹ Likewise Sallust states of L. Cornelius Sulla: *nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere*, “for I do not know whether I should feel shame or rather revulsion in describing what he did later on”.² A little before that statement Sallust briefly mentions even Sulla's

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¹ Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 63, 6. On this cf. G. Wille, *Der Mariusexkurs Kap. 63 im Aufbau von Sallusts Bellum Iugurthinum*, in: FS Vretska, Heidelberg 1970, 318; and also E. Koestermann, C. Sallustius Crispus, *Bellum Iugurthinum*, Heidelberg 1971, 241, who (in our opinion: wrongly) plays down the anticipation of Marius' later career. Still, Sallust gives us the occasional foretaste of Marius' dangerous precipitancy in quest of popularity: e. g. *neque facto ullo neque dicto abstinere, quod modo ambitiosum foret; milites, quibus in hibernis praeerat, laxiore imperio quam antea habere*, “he omitted no word or deed which might increase his popularity; he allowed the soldiers under his command in winter quarters to have more relaxed discipline than before” (64, 5). The same applies to Marius' relentless whipping up of popular sentiment against the nobles (84–86, 1) – an inducement to what Sallust views as the people's vice in the later civil wars, when it *libertatem in lubidinem uortere*, “perverted liberty to license” in its struggle against the nobility (41, 5).

² Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 95, 4.

eventual victory in the Civil Wars (*ciuilis uictoria*). Second, Sallust occasionally makes a remark which lets transpire that as he wrote of Marius and Sulla he may have had their later careers in mind. Thus he depicts Jugurtha as imagining of Sulla, *quom talem uirum in potestatem habuisset, tum fore uti iussu senatus aut populi foedus fieret; neque hominem nobilem non sua ignauia sed ob rem publicam in hostium potestate relictum iri*, “once he [Jugurtha] had gotten such a man [i. e. Sulla] into his power, then a treaty would be made by order of the Senate or the People; for a noble man, who had fallen into the hands of enemies not through his own indolence, but rather in the service of the Republic, would not be left behind in their power”.³ Granted, Jugurtha is here desperately mulling over arguments whereby to convince Bocchus to remain his ally, and a degree of wishful thinking of necessity inheres in such arguments. Still, we may wonder if Jugurtha or Bocchus could have thought that the Senate would bring the war to a grinding halt on account of an obscure legate with no accomplishments to his name,⁴ and it is easy to assume that Sallust’s words anachronistically look forward to the veteran commander and prominent politician of several decades later and retroject that figure into Jugurtha’s hopeful argumentation. Moreover, Sallust justifies his pamphlet on the Jugurthine War *inter alia* with the assertion that at this time the Roman people first began to oppose the nobility’s arrogance; but since the people itself exceeded justice in this, the entire fabric of the Roman state began to come apart.⁵ In other words the beginning of the civil wars, not just of the 80s B. C. but also of Sallust’s own day, lay in the 100s B. C.; and had to do with a tedious war in an out-of-the-way place called Numidia. In an almost Polybian way Sallust consciously traced the origins of the civil wars back to their “true” (truest?) beginning.⁶ Obviously, he ran the risk of inventing what he was looking for since, a priori, he was interpreting events at the time of the

³ Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 112, 3.

⁴ Sulla’s military quaestorship during the Jugurthine War was his first taste of office – see farther below n. 7. Moreover, all accounts agree that Sulla, though a patrician, came from an obscure branch of the Cornelii, no members of which had held the consulship in generations: Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 95, 3; Plut. Sulla, 1.

⁵ Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 5, 1/2; cf. 41/42. H.M. Last, *CAH*¹ 9, 114, suggests that for Sallust the Gracchi (who antedate the Jugurthine War and whom Sallust does mention at *Bell. Iug.* 16, 2 and 31, 7 and then discusses at 42) did not count as *populares* – the “popular” movement of Sallust’s political patron Caesar, so Last, traced itself back to Marius instead. W. Steidle, *Sallusts Historische Monographien* (Wiesbaden 1958), 60, argues that while Sallust may have accepted that factional fighting at Rome had begun before the Jugurthine War, only during this war did the course of the conflict take a decided turn in favour of the “people” – and this for Sallust, so Steidle, was the important point.

⁶ For Polybius’ theory of historical causation see *Histories*, 3, 6–7, 3. (Polybius has systematically explained what Thucydides merely posited in his excursus on the *Pentecontaetia* [1, 23, 4–6].)

Jugurthine War retrospectively, that is to say through the lens of events which came many decades after.

The curious fact, however, remains that both Marius and Sulla did use the Jugurthine War to kickstart their (stalled) military and political careers.⁷ That accident of history surely made an impression on Sallust. Moreover, Sallust's major historical work, the lost *Historiae*, while they dealt with the decade after Sulla's death, nonetheless had much to say about the dictator and his opponent.⁸ The *Historiae*, then, occasionally looked backwards in time, back along the intersecting trails of Marius' and Sulla's careers; trails which inexorably led to the dusty fields of Numidia, the later province of Africa Nova.

Although he, as a governor of that province, had one farther inducement to subject the activities of Sulla and Marius during the Jugurthine War to sustained historiographical analysis, surely, Sallust had not been the first to notice this historical coincidence.⁹ As we hope to shew, the overall historiographical situation strongly implies that Roman historians and politicians before Sallust had fought over the true meaning of the events of the Jugurthine War perhaps more

⁷ While Plut. Marius, 4/5 (cf. Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata, p. 202a/b; Cicero, Planc. 51; Val. Max. 6, 9, 14; Diod. 34/35; 38, 1), speaks of the numerous setbacks which Marius underwent while making his way up the lower rungs of the *cursus honorum*, Sallust, Bell. Iug. 63, 4/5 (cf. [Aur. Victor], De uiris illustribus, 67, 1), presents Marius' career as proceeding smoothly until it stalled on the verge of the highest office, the consulship – irreversibly so, in fact, had it not been for the Jugurthine War. Plutarch's version seems to us more likely to be correct, but that we must save for another investigation. Germane to the present article is simply this: for Sallust Marius restarted a stalled career in the Jugurthine War; and in this very point his situation presented a parallel for Sulla who in this very war got his own career started as the sources maintain unanimity in asserting Sulla's lack of military and political service before that date (Sallust, Bell. Iug. 95, 3; Plut. Sulla, 1/2; Val. Max. 6, 9, 6). Although Sallust omits the point, Sulla apparently started his career late: he was already thirty when he first became quaestor in Marius' army in 108 B. C. (Plut. Sulla, 6, 18; Vell. Pat. 2, 17, 3; Val. Max. 9, 3, 8; Appian, Bell. Ciuile, 1 105). (The other three men of this time, whose age upon attainment of the quaestorship is known, all reached it at an earlier age than Sulla: A. E. Astin, *The Lex Annalis before Sulla*, Bruxelles 1958, 44/45.) Still, in Sallust's presentation Marius and Sulla run nicely parallel in respect of (re)starting their careers, differing only in the point from which the respective career had to be (re)started. All the same, we may legitimately wonder whether Sallust "bent" Marius' career a bit to achieve the parallel.

⁸ For Sulla see Hist. 1, 55 (Oration of Lepidus); for Marius see Hist. 1, 77, esp. 7 (Oration of Philippus). St. Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei*, 2, 22, states that Sallust recounted Sulla's *facta*, and assuming that the saint's memory had not tricked him, Sallust can only have done so somewhere in the *Historiae*. On the conventional view (based on Sallust, Bell. Iug. 95, 2) Sallust composed the *Historiae* after finishing the *Bellum Iugurthinum*.

⁹ Even a dullard such as Velleius Paterculus could not help but notice it and actually comments on Marius' and Sulla's contemporaneous presence in Numidia with the words *ut praecautionibus fatis*, "as though fate were exercising forethought" (2, 12, 1).

bitterly than the soldiers in the actual war; and that what lifted this war above other (in terms of the expansion of Roman power and dominion) equally or even more important wars was nothing other than the presence in it of the two most important political figures of the first round of the civil wars which eventually tore apart the Republic.

At particular issue in the on-going historiographical debate on the Jugurthine War was the question of who “really” won the war. Even to contemporaries – not to mention us modern historians¹⁰ – the matter remained unclear. Two commanders, after all, celebrated triumphs for the Jugurthine War: Q. Caecilius Metellus (who additionally received the agnomen *Numidicus*)¹¹ and C. Marius.¹² Sallust’s own view in the matter Parker has sought elsewhere to elucidate: in a complex series of structured comparisons of Metellus and Marius Sallust put forward his argument that Marius, not Metellus, won the war – at least in the traditional military sense.¹³ One must accordingly assume that some of Sallust’s predecessors,¹⁴ on the other side of the question, had put forward the opposing view;¹⁵ and, indeed, in perusing the fragments of the other accounts of the war, one sees how often different historians sought to spin a given episode in Metellus’ and Marius’ careers now this way, now that.¹⁶ We do not intend to judge that issue here.

Instead we note that yet a third person advanced a claim to have achieved the deed which ended the war, though in the immediate aftermath of the war it seems to have passed notice. That person was none other than L. Cornelius Sulla. How Sallust treated that claim we now propose to discuss.

II. Marius and Sulla in the *Bellum Iugurthinum*

We begin by looking at the way in which Sallust, purposefully it seems to us, contrasts the two protagonists of the civil wars as each makes his appearance

¹⁰ See e. g. M. Holroyd, *The Jugurthine War: Was Marius or Metellus the real Victor?* JRS 18 (1928), 1–20.

¹¹ *Inscriptiones Italiae*, 13, 1, p. 85; Eutropius, 4, 27, 6; Vell. Pat., 2, 11, 2; [Aurelius Victor], *De uiris illustribus*, 62, 1.

¹² Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 114, 3; Plut. *Marius*, 12, 1; Eutropius, 4, 27, 6; Vell. Pat., 2, 12, 3.

¹³ See Parker, *Sallust and the Victor of the Jugurthine War*, *Tyche* 16 (2001), 111–125.

¹⁴ Sallust’s predecessors included: Sempronius Asellio (HRR 1, 179–184), M. Aemilius Scaurus (HRR 1, 185/186), P. Rutilius Rufus (FGrHist 815 = HRR 1, 187–190), L. Cornelius Sulla (HRR 1, 195–204), Q. Claudius Quadrigarius (HRR 1, 205–237), and Valerius Antias (HRR 1, 237–275). The Greek continuator of Polybius, Posidonius of Apamea, FGrHist 87, had also dealt with the events involved.

¹⁵ Plut. *Marius*, 10, 9 (cited below) reflects this other view.

¹⁶ Cf., e. g., with each other the following three accounts: Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 66/67, Plut. *Marius*, 8, 1–5, and Appian, *Num. fr.* 3.

on the stage. Let us look at Marius first. A soothsayer's prediction – that great and wondrous things awaited him – opens the initial extended remarks on Marius in chap. 63 of the *Bellum Iugurthinum*. Marius in fact receives the advice to put his fortune to the test as often as possible in reliance on the gods (*fretus dis ... fortunam quam saepissime experiretur*¹⁷) for *cuncta prospere euentura*, “all things would turn out to prosper him”. Divine favour rests, then, on Marius whom we have hitherto seen, as it were, mentioned in dispatches: commanding the cavalry rear (47, 6); an officer in the front ranks at the battle on the Muthul (50, 2); commanding half of the army as Metellus' right-hand man (55, 5–8); deputed to requisition corn at Sicca and acting swiftly in this capacity to turn round a rapidly deteriorating situation there (56, 3–5); commanding Italian cohorts at the siege of Zama (57, 1 and 58, 5: the latter passage lingers on Metellus' emotional exhortation to Marius); using a stratagem in the course of said siege and almost succeeding (60, 5–8). When the camera then comes to focus on Marius, we already know the man as a veteran officer of ability and energy whom Metellus routinely entrusts with commands.¹⁸

In chap. 63 the reader learns more about Marius than all the preceding terse dispatches could say. Marius possesses *industria, probitas, militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens domi modicus, lubricitatis et diuitiarum uictor, tantummodo gloriae auidus*, “industry; probity; great knowledge of military matters; and a spirit indomitable in war yet modest at home, proof against the temptations both of pleasure and of wealth, and above all eager for glory”. A man of little formal education, he also wants an ancient family. Especially on this last point his political career founders for *consulatum nobilitas inter se per manus tradebat*, “the nobles at that time used to pass the consulship on from hand to hand amongst themselves”. Although Marius has come far politically, holding the various lower magistracies in their turn, for want of family he dare not aspire to the consulship.

Now the reader has Marius' honourable mentions in dispatches in his mind, so much of the information imparted in this chapter actually finds confirmation in what (on the basis of his reading hitherto) the reader already knows (or at least is meant to know) of Marius; and the remainder he may accept purely on the strength of that. Just in case, however, the reader entertains some doubt, Sallust undertakes to hammer the yet unsubstantiated points home. In the next chapter he brings before our eyes the noble Metellus, how he at first politely, then arrogantly attempts to crush Marius' dream of someday becoming consul:

¹⁷ On the phrase Koestermann (above n. 1), 235 and 238.

¹⁸ Cf. on this also V. Werner, *Quantum bello optimus, tantum pace pessimus. Studien zum Mariusbild in der antiken Geschichtsschreibung* (Bonn 1995), 19/20.

quasi per amicitiam, “as though out of friendship”, he warns Marius *neu super fortunam animum gereret*,¹⁹ “not to aspire above his station in life”, and since *non omnia omnibus cupiunda esse*, “all things are not meant to be sought by all men”, *debere illi res suas satis placere*, “he should content himself with his present condition”. The famous anecdote of Metellus’ young son, that Marius could stand for the consulship as his colleague, needs no explication.

Finally, Sallust lets Marius hold a speech in chap. 85 and thus speak for himself: Marius underscores that he has no ancestors and that he lacks formal education. Unlike many nobles, who have no military experience, but read up on such matters in Greek textbooks when they come into office, he has found his instruction in the field. He lacks eloquence; has not studied Greek literature; knows nothing about dinner parties; has no cook on his staff; etc. All which Sallust stated of Marius in chap. 63 thus finds its corroboration in the other chapters of the *Bellum Iugurthinum*: the military experience in what preceded chap. 63, the remainder in what follows.²⁰

Now for Sulla who enters the story in chap. 95. He has not figured in dispatches because this is his first campaign. Unlike Marius, then, he has no military experience. But he does have ancestors; he studied Greek literature; he yields gladly to the temptations of pleasure; likes a luxurious lifestyle; is eloquent; etc. Quality after quality distinguishes Sulla as Marius’ polar opposite. A statement which appears later on (102, 4) farther confirms Sulla’s eloquence: an older legate actually defers to Sulla on account of the latter’s *facundia*, “excellence in speaking”. Still, Marius and Sulla do share some characteristics: both are exceptionally hard workers,²¹ both desire glory,²² and fortune to some degree favours them both.²³

¹⁹ On the meaning of *fortuna* here Koestermann (above n. 1), 243.

²⁰ Cf. Koestermann (above n. 1), 297: “Das Bild, das Marius hier selbst entwirft, deckt sich mit der Charakterisierung Sallusts, cap. 63, 3ff.” See farther E. Skard, *Marius’ Speech in Sallust Jug. Chap. 85*, SO 21 (1941), 98–102, with references to older analyses of Marius’ speech, and Werner (above n. 18), 46–68.

²¹ Sallust applies *industria* to both (Bell. Iug. 63, 2 and 95, 4).

²² Of Marius: *gloriae avidus* (Bell. Iug. 63, 2); of Sulla: *gloriae cupidior* (Bell. Iug. 95, 3).

²³ For Marius see the soothsayer’s prophecy (Bell. Iug. 63, 1); cf. Bell. Iug. 90, 1; cf. G. M. Paul, *A Historical Commentary on Sallust’s Bellum Jugurthinum*, Liverpool 1984, 166/167. For Sulla it sufficed for Sallust to play on the *agnomen* which Sulla later took, *Felix*, “Lucky, Fortunate, Favoured by the gods”: *illi felicissimo omnium ... fortuna fuit*, “this most fortunate man of all ... had luck” (Bell. Iug. 95, 4); Paul (op. cit.), 237; Koestermann (above n. 1), 342. H. C. Avery, *Marius Felix*, *Hermes* 95 (1967), 324–330, argues that Sallust purposefully builds up a picture of Marius’ “luck” in Bell. Iug. 92–94 so that Sulla’s superior “luck” can overshadow it.

Finally, Sulla is generous with his money²⁴ (perhaps we are to assume that Marius did not have much to be generous with²⁵); and Sulla possesses one more ominous quality: *ad simulanda negotia altitudo ingeni incredibilis*, “the depth of his mind, when it came to pretending one thing while meaning another, was simply not to be fathomed”.²⁶ This skill in hiding his true intentions Sulla shares with one other character in the *Bellum Iugurthinum*, M. Aemilius Scaurus,²⁷ which nobleman – in fact, Scaurus was the *princeps senatus* – Sallust describes as *inpiger, factiosus, avidus potentiae honoris diuitiarum, ceterum uitia sua callide occultans*, “energetic; given to partisanship; eager for power, office, and riches; moreover knowing to conceal his vices skilfully” (15, 4). (In 25, 4–26 we see the artful Scaurus – allegedly – contriving successfully to frustrate the Roman people’s will when the Senate appoints him to lead a delegation to Africa; in 28, 4–30 we see him again and again conspiring and conniving behind the scenes, always to Rome’s disadvantage and in favour of Jugurtha; until in 40, 4/5 he manipulates his way onto a judicial panel which Sallust views as especially severe).²⁸ Sulla, if anything, would seem however to excel even Scaurus in his capacity for dissembling.

This capacity adds particular depth to one farther comparison between Marius and Sulla. Sallust describes how Marius began to undermine the position of his commander Metellus, but states that Sulla in his turn did no such thing to Marius.²⁹ Superficially this appears as impartial criticism of Marius,³⁰ but at second glance one sees that Sulla, who, as will become apparent, is gradually displacing Marius, has merely succeeded in disguising his intent.³¹ The difference between the two inheres in the one’s talent at deception.

We hope that it is plain from the above that Sallust purposefully compares and contrasts Marius and Sulla, making clear which qualities distinguish the

²⁴ Cf. Plut. Sulla, 35, 1–4.

²⁵ Still, Diod. 34/35, 38, 2, speaks of Marius’ liberality. Moreover, Marius in the early 110s campaigned for the aedileship (Plut. Marius, 5, 1–3), an office which at this time mostly involved the distribution of largesse (see e. g. Plut. Sulla, 5, 1.2). Marius’ candidacy implies that he considered himself in possession of the requisite means though we might infer from his spectacular defeat that the voters felt otherwise.

²⁶ Koestermann’s paraphrase (above n. 1), 341: “Man konnte Sulla nicht auf den Grund der Seele schauen.”

²⁷ A. D. Leeman, *Aufbau und Absicht von Sallusts Bellum Iugurthinum*, Amsterdam 1957, 23, also notes the comparison with Scaurus.

²⁸ On Sallust’s presentation of Scaurus see (briefly) H. Cameron-V. Parker, *A Mobile People? Sallust’s presentation of the Numidians and their manner of fighting*, PdP 60 (2005), 33–35.

²⁹ Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 64, 5 and 96, 3.

³⁰ Thus Wille (above n. 1), 307/308.

³¹ Thus Leeman (above n. 27), 23.

two; which they have in common; and which special qualities each has in addition.³² Sallust does not do this for Metellus and Marius – those he contrasts in the details of their generalship instead³³ –, and we may surely constate that Sallust intended his readers to look at Marius and Sulla as two contrasted characters in point of background and personality. Given the rôles which both played in the later Civil Wars, Sallust's readers can hardly have looked at the two in any other way than as opposed figures. Sallust wrote, and his audience read, his booklet in full knowledge of how things had turned out in the end.

We leave open any number of questions as to the veracity of Sallust's presentation of the two men's characters and personal background. As with all such presentations, the spectre of literary construction looms large: Did Sallust play down Marius' education³⁴ whilst magnifying Sulla's to achieve the starkest contrast?³⁵ Was Marius completely immune to the allure of pleasure and luxury and, conversely, did Sulla truly incline to it so supinely?³⁶ And – the most significant question of all – did the junior officer L. Cornelius Sulla, on his first campaign ever, truly merit treatment this detailed in the *Bellum Iugurthinum* – and as much space³⁷ – on the basis of his military importance, or on the basis of what he later became (as Sallust himself hints at 95,2)? Or, as we hope to

³² On this see also Koestermann (above n. 1), 340/341 and 238/239; Wille (above n. 1), 318/319.

³³ See Parker (above n. 13), 111–125.

³⁴ Plutarch, *Marius*, 29, 5, can impute to Marius a line from the Greek poet Pindar (Fr. 194 Bowra = Stobaeus, 3, 11, 18), albeit only in the latter's private thought (i. e. as opposed to his public utterances: the quotation may spring entirely of Plutarch's literary reworking of what must have been going on in Marius' head). Cf. also the anecdote recounted at Val. Max. 3, 6, 6, in which Marius conspicuously models his behaviour on that of Dionysus in a Greek tale. At any rate Marius' modern biographers have howled in outrage at the portrayal of him as an uneducated rustic: T. F. Carney, *A Biography of C. Marius*, Assen 1960, 9 and 12; R. J. Evans, *Gaius Marius*, Pretoria 1994, 7 and 22.

³⁵ No-one else waxes eloquent on Sulla's knowledge of Greek literature or on his rhetorical achievements. As many have noted, Cicero does not list Sulla amongst the orators in the *Brutus*. Still, Athenaeus, 6, 78, p. 261c, asserts that Sulla composed satyric comedies in Latin. Cf. Appian, *Bell. Ciuile* 1, 97, where we should perhaps imagine Sulla himself composing the verse inscription in Greek.

³⁶ For discussion of Sulla's luxurious lifestyle during his youth as a literary topos see J. Griffin, *Antony and Propertius*, *JRS* 67 (1977), 21/22; A. La Penna, *Il retratto 'paradosale' da Silla a Petronio*, *Riv. Fil.* 104 (1976), 283–285. (As many others, we note a fundamental contradiction in the sources which on the one hand emphasise the straitened circumstances in which Sulla grew up [Plut. *Sulla*, 1] while at the same time asserting that he spent his youth as a voluptuary. Still, see A. Keaveney, *Sulla, the Last Republican*, London 1982, 7/8, and, in more detail, Young *Sulla and the Decem Stipendia*, *Riv. Fil.* 108 (1980), 166–169.

³⁷ Besides chap. 95, Sulla occupies the main rôle in chapters 102–113, approximately one-tenth of Sallust's booklet.

suggest below, on the basis of what politically charged historiographical debate later made of Sulla's actions?

III. Sulla and the Surrender of Jugurtha

Shortly after the end of the Jugurthine War in 106 B.C. Sulla had a signet ring made which depicted him receiving Jugurtha from Bocchus. The event evidently meant a great deal to Sulla; and ever after he sealed letters with that ring.³⁸ Marius clearly took no offence at this: On the contrary Marius continued to employ Sulla as an officer. In 104, when Marius held his second consulship, Sulla served under him as a legate in the wars against the Cimbri and the Teutones; and in 103, during Marius' third consulship, as a military tribune.³⁹ In 102 Sulla joined the staff of Marius' colleague in his fourth consulship, one Q. Lutatius Catulus.⁴⁰ This Catulus was a close associate of Marius',⁴¹ and, after three failed attempts at the consulship,⁴² had presumably needed Marius' support to achieve it. We may doubt that Catulus took Sulla on without Marius' approval. In fact, if Catulus really had been ἀμβλύτερος πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, "rather lackadaisical when it came to campaigns", as we read in Plutarch,⁴³ then Marius may

³⁸ Plut. Sulla, 3, 8; Marius, 10, 8/9; Val. Max. 8, 14, 4; Pliny, NH 37, 9. Sulla's son in 56 used the image on a coin: M. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*, Cambridge 1974, Nr. 426, 1.

³⁹ Plut. Sulla, 4, 1/2. P.F. Cagniard, *L. Cornelius Sulla's Quarrel with Marius at the time of the Germanic Invasions (104–101 B. C.)*, *Athenaeum* 67 (1989), 139–149, does not seem to us to have made his case that Sulla's appointment to a military tribunate represented a demotion.

⁴⁰ Plut. Sulla, 4, 3.

⁴¹ Diod. 38, 4, 3; cf. Plut. Marius, 14, 14. On Catulus as Marius' creature see E. Badian, *Lucius Sulla, the Deadly Reformer*, Sydney 1970, 9; R. G. Lewis, *Catulus and the Cimbri*, 102 B. C., *Hermes* 102 (1974), 107 n. 58, however, expresses some scepticism.

⁴² For 106: Cicero, *Planc.* 12; for 105: Cicero, *Mur.* 36; *Planc.* 12; and for 104: Cicero, *Planc.* 12. No glutton for punishment, Catulus seems to have sat out the elections for 103; and he may have required a special inducement (e. g. Marius' unequivocal backing) to stand a fourth time for 102.

⁴³ Plut. Sulla, 4, 3: Since Plutarch a few lines farther on (4, 5) cites Sulla's *Memoirs* as his source, this description of Catulus' generalship may well stem from Sulla himself, to whom, according to Plut. Sulla, 4, 4, τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα, "the most important and the greatest assignments" were now entrusted, Sulla's depiction of Catulus may have been entirely self-serving. At any rate Peter, *HRR* 1, 196, prints all of Plut. Sulla, 4, 1–5 as a fragment of Sulla's *Memoirs*. Still, Marius and his admirers may themselves have suggested as much about Catulus if the latter composed his apologetic pamphlet (see below n. 52) in response to their accusations of indolence and cowardice such as that implied in Plut. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, p. 202 d/e. Certainly Catulus himself viewed his military service in a different light (see below n. 52). For a modern appraisal of Catulus' generalship see Lewis (above n. 42), 90–109.

well have sent Sulla to Catulus in order to invigorate the latter's leadership. Sulla himself would later claim that Marius became jealous of his achievements on Catulus' staff in 102.⁴⁴ Still, it remains clear that Sulla to some extent owed his rise in the military to Marius' patronage and confidence in his ability. Setting aside Sulla's own self-serving recollections, compiled when he was an old man and long used to arranging matters (including the past) in accordance with his prejudices,⁴⁵ we have no evidence of any ill feelings between him and Marius until a date much later than 106 B. C. Although Plutarch believed otherwise,⁴⁶ Sulla's use, in 106, of a signet ring that depicted Jugurtha's surrender to him aroused at the time no apparent resentment or animosity in Marius.

After service with Catulus Sulla returned to Rome and, after an initial setback in 99 B. C., succeeded in election to the praetorship in 98 (for 97).⁴⁷ Thereafter he was sent to Asia Minor;⁴⁸ and, having survived prosecution for financial misdeeds (probably around late 95 or early 94),⁴⁹ in ca. 91 B. C. did something which deeply offended Marius: Bocchus, who had surrendered Jugurtha to him, sent gilt statues to Rome commemorating that event. The statues – along with statues of Victory bearing trophies – were erected on the Capitol. Now Bocchus can hardly have failed to consult with Sulla in this matter, and Sulla (as well as other senators) must have given his acquiescence.⁵⁰ Marius waxed wroth and tried to have the statues removed. Yet other politicians in Rome intervened on Sulla's side and thwarted Marius.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Sulla, HRR 1, 196, fr. 4 = Plut. Sulla, 4, 5.

⁴⁵ Sulla was still working on his Memoirs two days before he died (Plut. Sulla, 37, 1). Presumably he wrote the bulk of them after his retirement in 79 B. C.

⁴⁶ Plut. Sulla, 4, 1; Marius, 10, 7. A. Keaveney (above n. 37), 30, accepts Plutarch's view at face value; T. F. Carney, *Plutarch's Style in the Marius*, JHS 80 (1960), 26, argues that the back-dating of Marius' and Sulla's animosity is "historical anticipation" and serves literary purposes. Nonetheless, in his biography ([above n. 34], 53 n. 247) Carney argues on the basis of the anecdote at Val. Max. 6, 9, 6 (that Marius in 107 was vexed at the idea of a quaestor who had spent more time in the tavern than in the camp and received Sulla accordingly) that Sulla's and Marius' feud began already in 107.

⁴⁷ Plut. Sulla, 5, 1–4. For the date see Badian, *Sulla's Cilician Command*, *Athenaeum* 37 (1959), 280–284 (= *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford 1964, 158–160). The attempts at redating this episode have failed: see in defense of Badian's date A. Keaveney, *Deux dates contestées de la carrière de Sylla*, *Les Études Classiques* 48 (1980), 149–159 and R. Kallet-Marx, *The Trial of Rutilius Rufus*, *Phoenix* 44 (1990), 127 n. 15.

⁴⁸ Plut. Sulla, 5, 6.

⁴⁹ Plut. Sulla, 5, 12. For the date see Badian (above n. 47), 299/300 (169/170).

⁵⁰ On consultation with the Senate and Sulla see Badian (above n. 41), 12. On Bocchus' motivation see P. F. Cagniart, *L. Cornelius Sulla in the 90s: A reassessment*, *Latomus* 50 (1991), 293–295.

⁵¹ Plut. Sulla, 6, 1/2; Marius, 32, 4/5. Plutarch (whose account alone we have of this dispute) dates it to the eve of the Social War, hence the date in the text (for which see farther

What had happened between 106 B. C. (when Marius took no notice of Sulla's drawing attention to Jugurtha's surrender to him as his special achievement and, instead, helped him continue his career) and ca. 91 when Marius began a political fight over these statues' erection? We note that this was not just a fit of pique on Marius' part or some vainglory of Sulla's: other prominent men in Rome were willing to participate in this fight, i. e. viewed the matter as significant and well worth a fight. What made the erection of these statues such a political issue?

Let us recall that the greater issue of who "really" won the Jugurthine War was itself in dispute.⁵² Some clearly had viewed Metellus as the true victor; and we may surmise readily enough that those who felt that way came mostly from the nobility and looked down on Marius as an upstart. By ca. 91 one pamphlet by a participant in the Jugurthine War – the memoirs of M. Aemilius Scaurus – may have already appeared.⁵³ That of P. Rutilius Rufus may have been available

Badian [above n. 41], 12). As Badian's reflexions, op. cit., 9–11, shew, while Sulla at some point must have disassociated himself from Marius, we have no way of reliably determining when or on the basis of what considerations.

⁵² See above, text to Nn. 10–16. As a parallel we may refer to another similar debate concerning the wars against the Cimbri and the Teutones: Q. Lutatius Catulus published a pamphlet (HRR 1, 191–194) in which he sought to play up his part in achieving victory in those campaigns (to the diminution of Marius'). Carney (above n. 34), 53 n. 247, actually suggests that Sulla began using the problematic signet ring during the course of this debate between Catulus and Marius. At any rate, Catulus, HRR 1, 191, Fr. 1 (= Plut. Marius, 25) accused Marius of having arranged the plan for the battle of Vercellae in 101 B. C. so as to give himself all the glory. As it turned out, however, Catulus' troops bore the brunt of the fighting (Sulla, HRR 1, 197, Fr. 6 [= Plut. Marius, 26]), and Catulus claimed that he deserved the credit for the victory (HRR 1, 191/192, Fr. 3 [= Plut. Marius, 27]). As to the date of Catulus' pamphlet we know only that Sulla consulted this work for his own Memoirs (HRR 1, 195–204) which he completed in the early 70s B. C. Meanwhile it remains unclear to the current authors whether Catulus' pamphlet appeared in response to denigrations of his performance (thus F. Münzer, *Lutatius*, 7, RE 13.2, 2075) or whether it opened a debate about who really won that particular war (thus Carney [above n. 34], 38/39). In any case Marius and Catulus celebrated a joint triumph (Plut. Marius, 27, 10), so the official reality of the year 101 B. C. was that both had contributed equally to the victory. Finally, the only attested fragments from Catulus' work are those which Plutarch cites: Plutarch at Marius, 25, 8; 26, 10; and 27, 6, makes clear that he is using the work only indirectly; and since the work is cited only for agreement with Sulla's Memoirs which Plutarch cites in the same breath (Sulla, Fr. 5/6 = Catulus, Fr. 1/2 = Plut. Marius, 25 and 26), most have concluded that Plutarch knew Catulus' pamphlet only through the medium of Sulla's Memoirs. A frightening amount of Plutarch's "erudition" in like wise stems from such second-hand reading.

⁵³ HRR 1, 185/186. We cannot give anything approaching a precise date: Badian, *The Early Historians*, in: T. A. Dorey (Ed.), *The Latin Historians*, London 1966, 23, suggests that Scaurus wrote "probably late in the first decade of the first century".

by now as well.⁵⁴ We have little idea of how these authors presented the question of the achieving of the war's victory, but we have little reason to believe that either was favourable to Marius.⁵⁵ Counterblasts from the other side may have already appeared: we simply do not know.⁵⁶ At any rate, an historiographical debate had already begun; and certain questions about the war and its conduct – we do not hesitate to speak here of revisionism – were being raised.

If aristocratic opponents of Marius were coming to the aid of the aristocrat Sulla in a dispute with Marius (whose protégé he ironically had once been⁵⁷) over an event near the end of the Jugurthine War – namely the surrender of Jugurtha –, then we can offer only one explanation as to why an event, the depiction of which had hitherto been inoffensive, when depicted now, should cause a terrific feud. The meaning of certain events during the Jugurthine War was now being contested; and those statues, which emphasised Sulla's rôle in the war, clearly touched upon what had by now become an uncomfortable point. Jugurtha's surrender, after all, had arguably ended the war. The war had dragged on and on – long after Jugurtha had given up all hope of straightforwardly defeating the Romans; long after Metellus had effectively driven Jugurtha from

⁵⁴ FGrHist 815 = HRR 1,187–190. Rutilius fell victim to a politically motivated prosecution possibly as early as 94 B. C. (see Kallet-Marx [above n. 47], 126–129) and then went into exile. He presumably composed his Histories thereafter though, of course, this guess carries as much conviction as any other.

⁵⁵ For Rutilius we have certainty: Cassius Dio, 28,97,3, attests Marius' involvement in securing Rutilius' conviction (though E. S. Gruen, Political Prosecutions in the 90s B. C., *Historia* 15 [1966], 54, is cautious about accepting this); and Rutilius, FGrHist 815, Fr. 4 = HRR 1, 188, Fr. 4 = Plut. Marius, 28, 8) speaks decidedly ill of Marius. As for Scaurus, no surviving fragment of his work mentions Marius. Still, both Sallust and Cicero present him as a highly energetic partisan of the *nobilitas* against all challengers (Cicero, *Pro Sest.* 39 and 101; Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 15, 4), and as such he can hardly have viewed Marius with much favour. Although Cicero does directly attest enmity between Marius and Scaurus (*De prou. cons.* 19), in 100 B. C. the two politicians formed a (temporary?) alliance against Saturninus ([Aur. Victor], *De uiris illustribus*, 72, 9): so they were capable of cooperating under duress at least (Carney [above n. 34], 43/44, argues that Scaurus did so only with ulterior motives and promptly outmanoeuvred the less wily Marius). A dark, and possibly textually unsound, passage in Pliny (*NH* 36, 116) might suggest some additional cooperation (see E. Frank, *Marius and the Roman Nobility*, *CJ* 50 [1955], 150; Carney, *Marius' Choice of Battle-field in the Campaign of 101*, *Athenaeum* 6 [1958], 234–237, perhaps goes beyond the evidence) though the passage does admit of other interpretations: see Badian, *Q. Mucius Scaevola and the Province of Asia*, *Athenaeum* 34 (1956), 120 n. 3. In any case, notwithstanding temporary alliances where interests overlapped, Scaurus and Marius seem to have been political enemies.

⁵⁶ See below for an attempt to determine the arguments which the pro-Marian pamphleteers sought to advance.

⁵⁷ On Marius as Sulla's patron see Badian (above n. 41), 6–8, but n. b. the scepticism of Paul (above n. 23), 237/238.

Numidia; long after the Romans had placed a garrison in practically every place of note – until Marius finally took possession of Jugurtha’s person. But did he? It was Sulla that did that.

And this gave the event its political resonance.⁵⁸ For from a certain point of view Sulla had ended the war – in fact, won it: with the statues of Jugurtha’s surrender to Sulla came, we recall, several statues of Victory⁵⁹ to make the meaning of Jugurtha’s surrender pellucid to all beholders. Clearly, emphasising this act of Sulla’s tended to hollow out one of Marius’ claims to fame. Plutarch’s words bear citing here:

Ὁ μὲν οὖν θριαμβεύων ἐπὶ τούτῳ Μάριος ἦν, ἡ δὲ δόξα τοῦ κατορθώματος, ἦν ὁ Μαρίου φθόνος Σύλλα προσετίθει, παρελύπει τὸν Μάριον ἡσυχῆ.⁶⁰

“It was Marius that celebrated a triumph for this, but the renown for having done the deed, which those envious of Marius attributed to Sulla, vexed Marius privately.”

Marius held the triumph for ending the war against Jugurtha, but those who envied him claimed that Sulla deserved the credit. Moreover, those who not two decades earlier had arranged for Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus to celebrate a triumph for the war in Numidia clearly entertained doubts of their own about Marius’ claims to have won this particular war. Plutarch explicitly makes the connexion for us:

... ἐναγόντων μάλιστα τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μέγιστα τῷ Μετέλλῳ, τὰ δ’ ἔσχατα καὶ τὸ πέρασ αὐτοῦ Σύλλα προστιθέντων ...⁶¹

“Those who most envied him [Marius] ascribed both the first and the most important acts in the war to Metellus while attributing the final acts and its conclusion to Sulla.”

Hence Sulla found willing supporters in his conflict with Marius over the statues.

Although we have no secure way of ascertaining what exactly a given pamphleteer or, if one must use a nobler title, historian of the first century B. C. had to say about Sulla’s receipt of Jugurtha, we can at least delineate the general terms of the debate. In varying degrees imperial authors such as Appian and Cassius Dio drew on these earlier authors (usually, one suspects, at second or even third hand) in compiling their own accounts which, for the Republican period, are almost entirely derivative.⁶² The Imperial authors who relied (at whatever remove)

⁵⁸ Cf. Paul (above n. 23), 257.

⁵⁹ Plut. Marius, 32, 4/5 (cf. Sulla, 6, 1/2).

⁶⁰ Plut. Sulla, 3, 7.

⁶¹ Plut. Marius, 10, 9.

⁶² “Der lästige, undurchdringliche Nebel, den die moderne sogenannte Quellenforschung ... womöglich noch verdichtet hat”, occludes any access to the path by which this or that piece of information reached Appian. Thus E. Schwartz, Appianus, 2, RE 2. 1 (1895), 222,

on Livy unfortunately admitted into their accounts occasional non-Livian elements; and Livy himself relied on more than one source.⁶³ Diodorus copied out Posidonius,⁶⁴ and Posidonius, whilst he in his turn had consulted Rutilius Rufus, had relied on him neither exclusively nor slavishly.⁶⁵ While Plutarch made much use of Sulla's Memoirs, he does cite other works as well.⁶⁶

beyond whose conclusions in regard to the relevant sections of Appian (222–226) no-one has yet proceeded: “Nur so viel ist sicher erkennbar, daß weder Poseidonius, noch Sallust, noch Livius direkt und ausschließlich benutzt sind” (222). At least the various contributions in vol. 34, 1 of ANRW by K. Brodersen (see esp. 356–359), F. J. Gómez Espelósín (see esp. 422–425), C. G. Leidl (see esp. 446–459), G. Marasco (see esp. 484/485), and D. Magnino (see esp. 547–549) have not improved on Schwartz's conclusion. On Appian's work as a whole see now: B. Goldmann, *Einheitlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian*, Hildesheim 1988. As for Cassius Dio and his sources see the concordances which Schwartz in tireless labour compiled for Cassius Dio, RE 3.2 (1899), 1691–1714 (pre-imperial period only). The wild mixture of possible ultimate and intermediate sources comes of the many stages of transmission which lie between a given ultimate source and Cassius. F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio*, Oxford 1964, 34–38, mostly refuses to discuss the question of Cassius' sources.

⁶³ Badian, *Waiting for Sulla*, JRS 52 (1962), 49–51 (= *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, 211–214) makes a good circumstantial case that Livy in this section of the *Ab urbe condita* was using as one of his sources the work of Cornelius Sisenna (HRR I, 276–297) and the Memoirs of Sulla as another, though we would add the qualification that the use may have been indirect for all we know. Moreover, Badian in suggesting an explanation for the correspondences between Plut. Sulla, 22, 1, on the one hand and Eutropius, 5, 7, 4, and Orosius, 5, 20, 1, on the other (i. e. that both Livy and Plutarch were following Sulla's Memoirs), does not consider the possibility that non-Livian material may have found its way into the epitomators' accounts (as, regrettably, it sometimes did: see e. g. Florus, 1, 36, 14, where we find material from Sallust, Bell. Jug. 93, 2). J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS 55 (1965), 231 (review of *Studies in Greek and Roman History*) raised a similar point regarding the *Periocha* (which does not always accurately reflect the content of a given Livian book: e. g. Livy, 44, 37, 5, states that C. Sulpicius Gallus announced that an eclipse would occur during the battle of Pydna in 167 B. C. – the *Periocha* has L. Aemilius Paullus doing this; Aemilius' prayer at Livy, 45, 41, 8, appears in the *Periocha* for 44; at Livy, 28, 17, 12, Scipio leaves for Africa from Carthago Nova, but in the *Periocha* from Tarraco; and so on). Badian misapprehends the objection (above n. 41), 4 n. 2 and again Sulla's *Augurate*, *Arethusa* 1 (1968), 46 n. 65; and despite his assertions does not rebut it in: *Where was Sisenna?* *Athenaeum* 42 (1964), 422–431.

⁶⁴ See J. Malitz, *Die Historien des Poseidonios* (München 1983), 34–42. The case rests in the first instance on the correspondence of a named quotation from Posidonius with the relevant fragment of Diodorus (cf. FGrHist 87, Fr. 7 = Athenaeus, 12, 59, p. 542b with Diod. 34/35, 2, 10–14 and 39–40).

⁶⁵ On Posidonius' use of Rutilius see Malitz (above n. 64), 360/361 and also 95, 368, 395, and 397. See esp. Posidonius, FGrHist 87, Fr. 27 = Athenaeus, 4, 66, p. 168de = Rutilius, FGrHist 815, T 4b; and cf. (in respect of the judgement on Apicius) Rutilius' comments on Sittius at FGrHist 815, Fr. 5 = HRR 1, 188, Fr. 6 = Athenaeus, 12, 61, p. 543b.

⁶⁶ For Plutarch's use of Sulla see below n. 67. Plutarch also claims to have consulted: P. Rutilius Rufus (Marius, 28, 8); Posidonius (Marius, 45, 7); Fenestella (Sulla, 28, 14), and

A brief review of these authors' accounts then will stake out the general terms of the debate in their ultimate sources. – In Plutarch we read an account⁶⁷ – quite possibly, at whatever remove, Sulla's own⁶⁸ – in which Sulla, acting entirely on his own initiative, took the act which gained Bocchus' friendship for the Romans: Sulla gave aid to some of the King's envoys who had escaped from the clutches of robbers. Impressed, Bocchus later wrote a letter to Marius in which he broached the possibility of Jugurtha's surrender and sought Sulla's aid in arranging the matter. Thereupon Sulla – although he did dutifully inform Marius of his intentions – at great risk to himself went to Bocchus to receive Jugurtha. In this account everything depends on Sulla's initiative and pluck. Marius remains completely passive (though both Bocchus and Sulla keep him apprised of matters as they develop).

an otherwise unknown C. Piso (Marius, 45, 8) on whom Peter, HRR 1, 380, and Malitz (above n. 64), 361–405. On Plutarch's use of Catulus above n. 52. Carney, *A Textual Study in Plutarch's Marius*, SO 36 (1960), 91–93, argues that Plutarch also used Lucullus. Other works (unmentioned) presumably lay on Plutarch's desk as well: let us recall that Plutarch in his life of Eumenes of Cardia never once mentioned the history composed by Hieronymus of Cardia (he does refer once to Hieronymus at 12, 2) although he relied on it heavily (as comparison with Diodorus – e. g. Diod. 18, 31 with Plut. Eumenes, 7, 4–9 or Diod. 18, 42, 3/4 with Plut. Eumenes, 11, 5–7 – will shew: n. b. Diod. 18, 50, 4 and 19, 44, 3). On Plutarch's (in our view: probable) more or less contemporaneous composition of the Marius and the Sulla cf. C. B. R. Pelling, *Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives*, JHS 99 (1979), 74–96.

⁶⁷ Plutarch tells the story both in the Marius (10) and in the Sulla (3). Although Plutarch himself (Marius, 10, 2) calls his account in the Sulla the more detailed, the Marius does offer some information missing from the other account, in particular that Bocchus, having previously received aid from Sulla, wrote a public letter to Marius interceding for Jugurtha, and a private one offering to betray him. In this latter letter Bocchus requested the services of Sulla. In the account in the Sulla Plutarch mentions no correspondence between Bocchus and Marius and contents himself with the phrase that Bocchus ἐκάλει τὸν Σύλλαν, “called upon Sulla”. The briefer passage does not contradict the fuller; and the overall correspondence of the two accounts suffices to attribute them to the same source (presumably Sulla's Memoirs or some tract heavily dependent on them). In the text above the two accounts have simply been combined.

⁶⁸ Much of what stands in Plutarch's lives of Sulla and Marius is intensely pro-Sullan in nature. Since Plutarch's heavy use of Sulla's Memoirs is well-established (he cites the work no fewer than thirteen times in the Sulla – 4, 5; 5, 2; 6, 8 and 10; 14, 3 and 10; 16, 1; 17, 2; 19, 8; 23, 5; 27, 6; 28, 15; 37, 1 – and besides these, three times in the Marius 25, 6; 26, 6; 35, 4), explaining this pro-Sullan bias does not cause too many problems: absent any indication of the opposite, Plutarch is presenting Sulla's line. Otherwise Keaveney, *Roman Treaties with Parthia*, AJP 102 (1981), 200 n. 23, who states that all of the “distortions ... to magnify Sulla's achievement” and the “impression that Sulla's freedom of action [i. e. in the negotiations with Bocchus] was greater than it really was” result purely of Plutarch's artistic license.

Appian's account,⁶⁹ to which we come next, merits special attention as it may derive (ultimately) from a source which Sallust also used. In both authors Bocchus complains that Marius has laid hands on territory which Bocchus had previously taken from Jugurtha: that snippet out of the prior dealings of the two African princes with one another adds a curious turn to the strange, diplomatic pas-de-trois at the end of the Jugurthine War, a circumstance which perhaps led to its survival in both accounts.⁷⁰ Moreover, a reconstruction of the account which lay behind both Appian's and Sallust's may actually succeed to a degree. In Appian's account we read how, of the two Roman ambassadors, A. Manlius spoke after Bocchus' speech (of Sulla's speaking not a word). In Sallust, however, before Bocchus' speech Sulla holds forth (of Manlius' speaking not a word). The two accounts could derive from a common version in which the order of speakers ran Sulla-Bocchus-Manlius.⁷¹ All the same, we need to reckon with reforming of that common material in both Sallust and Appian, although in the case of the latter, to whom exclusively we now turn, we probably should attribute any such reforming to his immediate (i. e. an intermediate) source. With Appian, unfortunately, we must also maintain an awareness that the excerpts' fragmentary state may mislead.

That said, let us begin. First, in Appian Sulla does not speak. If this omission does not fall to the account of Appian's Byzantine excerptor,⁷² then in Appian the credit for bringing Bocchus round to the Roman side shifted from Sulla to the innocuous non-entity Manlius. Moreover, we next hear a slightly different account of those envoys whom Sulla helped. Sulla's aid to them now occurs when the negotiations between Marius and Bocchus are already in progress. Sulla entertains the envoys – until Marius arrives and tells them to obey Sulla in all points. Sulla's standing with the envoys depends then on Marius' say-so since Sulla, it seems, cannot make any substantive decision without Marius in this story. In fact, Bocchus later sends other envoys not to Sulla, but to Marius – and requests that Marius send out Sulla to him. Marius does so. On this presentation it appears as if he and Bocchus move the pawn Sulla back and forth across Numidia in their negotiations (n. b. the contrast to how nearly the same actions

⁶⁹ Appian, Num. Frr. 4/5.

⁷⁰ Appian, Num. Fr. 4, 1; Sallust, Bell. Iug. 102, 13 (whereby, strictly speaking, in Appian Marius actually occupies the land in question whereas Sallust has Bocchus mention Marius' mere plundering thereof). We owe this astute observation, as well as much of the immediately following, to Herbert Heftner (see first note).

⁷¹ We owe this reconstruction to Herbert Heftner (see first note).

⁷² The fragment comes from the so-called *Excerpta de legationibus* compiled for the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus. The excerptor theoretically could have omitted the account's initial paragraph in which mention of Sulla's speech had stood. Alternately, Appian's immediate source could have carried out the omission in conscious diminution of Sulla's rôle.

appear in Plutarch's version). Appian's account breaks off at the point when we are about to learn how Bocchus arranged to get possession of Jugurtha for the handover. But in what survives of Appian's account we do see how Sulla's rôle in securing Jugurtha's surrender wanes at every point. Manlius speaks instead of Sulla; Sulla's standing with Bocchus' envoys rests entirely on Marius' vouching for him; Bocchus and Marius negotiate with Sulla out of the loop; Sulla acts only as Marius' instrument.⁷³

Diodorus, following Posidonius, took a slightly different tack.⁷⁴ In this account we see Bocchus applying first to Marius for peace and then, at Marius' direction, to the Senate. When the Senate answers that it will approve peace only at Marius' approval, Marius asks Bocchus to hand over Jugurtha as the price for peace. The person whom Marius sends to take receipt of Jugurtha happens to be Sulla. The emphasis on Marius' correct behaviour vis-à-vis the Senate's authority to make peace and, likewise, on the Senate's confidence in Marius' judgement in the entire matter betokens an attitude entirely favourable towards Marius. Sulla, on the other hand, plays no rôle in the negotiations themselves; his rôle shrinks to that of the legate to whom Marius happened to assign the duty of collecting Jugurtha.⁷⁵

Now such minimisation of Sulla's rôle could conceivably go even farther. In Cassius Dio's admittedly brief and fragmentary account not only do Bocchus and Marius negotiate with one another directly, but Sulla does not even receive a mention.⁷⁶

Livy on the other hand seems (at the least) to have mentioned Sulla in the story though his account has perished and we must rely entirely on his miserable epitomators and epigones who do not always accurately reflect what he said. Florus simply records that Bocchus handed Jugurtha over to Sulla.⁷⁷ Eutropius phrases it thus: *bello ... terminum posuit capto Iugurtha per quaestorem suum Cornelium Sullam, ingentem uirum, tradente Boccho Iugurtham*, "[Marius] put an end to the war when Jugurtha was taken captive by his quaestor, Cornelius Sulla, a great man, when Bocchus betrayed Jugurtha".⁷⁸ Orosius writes that *Bocchus ... Iugurtham ... per Syllam legatum misit ad Marium*, "Bocchus ... sent Jugurtha ... to Marius through the legate Sulla".⁷⁹ If we may trust the wording in the Periocha, however, it does not appear that Livy purposefully attempted to

⁷³ Of modern scholars J. Carcopino, *Sylla, ou la monarchie manquée*, Paris 1947, 23, more or less adopts this position.

⁷⁴ Diod. 34/35; 39.

⁷⁵ Cf. on this Malitz (above n. 63), 399 n. 336.

⁷⁶ Cassius Dio, 26, 89, 6.

⁷⁷ Florus, 1, 36.

⁷⁸ Eutropius, 4, 27, 4.

⁷⁹ Orosius, 5, 15, 18.

minimise Sulla's rôle: *Jugurtha ... uinctus ab eo [Boccho] et Mario traditus est, in qua re praecipua opera L. Corneli Syllae, quaestoris C. Marii, fuit*, "Jugurtha was taken prisoner by him [Bocchus] and handed over to Marius, in which deed exceptional services were rendered by L. Cornelius Sulla, C. Marius' quaestor".⁸⁰ If the *Periocha* accurately reflect the general thrust of Livy's presentation, then Livy, if anything, played the rôle of Sulla up. Still, the brevity of these passages frustrates any attempt at detailed analysis.

We see here a clear political debate played out historiographically. While "pro-Sullan" historians emphasised Sulla's rôle to the near exclusion of Marius, others sought to minimise Sulla's rôle or even to eliminate him from the story entirely. We may draw a farther conclusion from this: no-one denied the significance of Jugurtha's surrender in ending the war. Even the tersest surviving account – whatever pamphleteer it derived from ultimately – ends the story of the war with Jugurtha's surrender. In the course of the on-going debate it became an historiographically established fact that Jugurtha's surrender was a key event which all (including the *Periocha* which devoted all of five lines to book 66 of Livy) had to mention for it was that event which (on this understanding: indisputably) ended the war. That is why those who wished to counter the claim that Sulla deserved the credit did not choose to argue that the war was already over before Bocchus surrendered Jugurtha – in theory, at least, a viable option historiographically. Instead, they had to argue away Sulla's rôle in procuring the surrender.

Now it should be clear why Marius tried to remove the gilt statues which shewed Sulla receiving Jugurtha. Between 106 and ca. 91 B. C. it had become "known" that Jugurtha's surrender had ended the war; and the statues in question advanced a claim that Sulla deserved the credit for bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Marius' detractors, moreover, were perfectly willing to listen to this sort of revisionism; and their opponents, accepting the core holding in the other side's verdict, had to respond with a kind of counter-revisionism.

IV. Sallust's Portrayal of the Surrender⁸¹

We now turn to Sallust's account of this event, the sole account of the Jugurthine War which survives in its entirety. Superficially, Sallust steers a middle

⁸⁰ *Periocha*, 66.

⁸¹ Paul (above n. 23), 234/235, 245, and 254, argues that Sallust used Sulla's *Memoirs* as his principal source for this section of his work: cf. Last (above n. 5), 115/116; Funaioli, *Sallustius*, 10, RE, 2. Reihe, 1.2 (1928). The differences between Sallust's version and that which we find recounted in Plutarch make it highly unlikely that Sallust used only Sulla's pamphlet; as should emerge from our analysis below, Sallust, while he probably did know Sulla's *Memoirs*, knew other works as well and in any case formed the whole according to his own views.

course between the pro-Sullan and the pro-Marian versions: as Parker has observed elsewhere, Sallust tends to avoid blatant partisanship.⁸² For one thing, (unlike the account in Plutarch) Sallust does not engage in the idle pretence that the negotiations began entirely because of acts of Sulla's. Yet Sulla still plays an important, indeed decisive rôle in these negotiations (unlike the accounts in Appian or Cassius Dio). In fact, Sallust allows Sulla – whom he has described as both ambitious and deceptive – to keep gaining in prominence as the negotiations proceed – precisely through some of those talents which distinguish him from Marius.

In Sallust the initial impulse for negotiations comes from Bocchus who, appropriately enough, sends messages to the Roman commander C. Marius who obliges by sending two envoys. Now he happens to choose A. Manlius and L. Cornelius Sulla. We note that Sulla initially is out of the loop and entirely passive. When, however, the envoys come to Bocchus, Manlius, although he outranks Sulla in point of age, nevertheless in deference to Sulla's eloquence allows the latter to speak. Sallust seems aware that some disputed that Sulla actually spoke at this meeting and, in insisting that Sulla did speak, explains the anomaly of the younger man's speaking with a reference to Sulla's eloquence (to which Sallust has already adverted).⁸³ The apparent even-handedness in this presentation – now ignoring the pro-Sullan version, now denying allegations of the anti-

⁸² Parker (above n. 13). In many ways Werner's detailed analysis of Sallust's presentation of Marius' character (above n. 18), 18–91, summarised 92–96, confirms this avoidance: by censuring Marius on occasion, perhaps even as Werner argues, by signalling studied disapproval overall of Marius' means to attain the consulship, Sallust does certainly raise himself from the ranks of the mere *Tendenzschriftsteller*. Yet evenhandedness on the surface neither guarantees historical accuracy nor rules out deeper-lying partisan views; in fact, it can provide a distracting glare beneath which an author may advance his case. At any rate Sallust's apparent impartiality surely helped his pamphlet to survive where so many others perished save for a few miserable fragments. One may usefully refer to the confident remarks of Sir Ronald Syme who, dismissive of attempts to see partisan distortion in Sallust (Sallust, Berkeley 1964, 157 n. 1), could calmly write in furtherance of his belief in Sallust's non-partisan accuracy that "what Metellus achieved in warfare is set forth in full detail and favourably; Marius is prominent on show, but not magnified unduly; nor is the alert diplomacy of Sulla in any way depreciated" (157). On Metellus see farther 158/159; on Sulla 177. The comments surprise in so astute a critic as Sir Ronald, but, like Thucydides, Sallust understood to pose convincingly as an impartial recorder. Finally, we should here note that the highly influential (and justly so) work of K. Vretska, *Studien zu Sallusts Bellum Iugurthinum*, Wien 1955, seems to us to focus too much on the (in our opinion) intentionally equitable and in any case studiously considered distribution of positive epithets as a guide to Sallust's final judgements.

⁸³ If the attempted reconstruction of the putative common account behind both Sallust's and Appian's versions hit the mark (see above to n. 71), then Sallust purposefully deleted Manlius' speech. We owe this suggestion to Herbert Heftner (above, first note).

Sullan one – in the end proves astonishingly well-gearred to fit in with one of Sallust's previous comments on Sulla.

Then we come to the episode with the rescued envoys which Sallust, again departing from the pro-Sullan version, brings only after the negotiations have started. Yet Sallust adds his own twist to the story. Sulla, in Sallust's explicit words, deceives the envoys with his friendliness and gifts into thinking that he harbours good intentions towards the Mauretanians. The envoys, trusting Sulla, reveal to him their message for Marius and ask his advice. Again we see Sulla making good use of two of the attributes which Sallust attests for him: liberality and deception. Having learnt the envoys' message, Sulla instructs them in how to address Marius and later the Senate. Three go on to Rome; two return to Bocchus and speak of Sulla's friendliness. Unbeknownst to Marius, Sulla has successfully inserted himself into this round of negotiations.

The Senate now agrees in principle to peace with Bocchus, but stipulates, ambiguously, that Bocchus must first earn this. It omits to state how. Perhaps we are to imagine that this results of Sulla's instructions to the envoys. Negotiations between Bocchus and Marius resume; and Bocchus – persuaded of Sulla's friendship – requests Marius to send Sulla to him as ambassador. Sulla now reaps the benefit of his previous duplicity.

Sallust then treats us to an account of Sulla's near incredible *sang froid* on the dangerous journey to Bocchus. We cannot help but stand in awe of Sulla in these passages. Sulla, whose cool resolve not even Jugurtha's presence in the neighbourhood can shake, arrives at Bocchus' camp and during the negotiations calmly makes his audacious play: If Bocchus will capture and hand over Jugurtha, Bocchus will have peace. Sulla thus, entirely on his own initiative on Sallust's presentation, invests, with considerable effrontery, the Senate's response with concrete meaning. Marius, it seems, had never thought of asking Bocchus for that. After some hesitation Bocchus accedes; and Sulla leads the captive Jugurtha back to Marius. The war ends; and Sallust wraps up the *Bellum Iugurthinum* with abrupt dispatch: precisely 80 additional words.

The mere recounting of Sallust's version already makes some things clear. First, Sallust takes his basic "facts" from the pamphleteers who went before; he merely avoids their obvious distortions. For example, he includes the story of Sulla's entertaining of the robbed ambassadors – just declines to pretend that no prior negotiations had taken place.⁸⁴ Likewise, he includes the Senate's response

⁸⁴ When reading the account in Plut. Sulla, 3, the question arises, to whom was Bocchus sending these envoys and with what in mind? After all, if the envoys, after being robbed, fled to the Romans' (i. e. their enemies') camp, then they can only have done so because they expected a good reception there. In other words, the envoys' actions are more explicable before a background of already begun negotiations between Bocchus and the

to Bocchus' envoys, only without the self-evident propaganda of Marius' scrupulous regard for the Senate and the Senate's corresponding confidence in Marius' ability to make the appropriate decision.⁸⁵

Second, Sallust has clearly tailored his account to fit his own view of Sulla's character. Moreover, as we have already noted, knowledge of Sulla's later career coloured that view to a degree. Unsurprisingly, Sallust's departures from his predecessors – i. e. where he presents material absent from their accounts – come at those points at which Sallust makes his account fit his view of Sulla. For example, Sallust accepts that A. Manlius was present at the first audience before Bocchus (as in Appian), but insists that only Sulla, by reason of his eloquence, actually spoke. That is missing from other accounts; and it fits purely to Sallust's own view of Sulla. To take another example: Both Plutarch and Appian mention the robbed Mauretanian envoys' entertainment by Sulla, but only Sallust states that Sulla insinuated himself into their confidence and then slyly instructed them in what to say to Marius.⁸⁶ Few could have undertaken to contradict Sallust directly as no-one, save Sulla and the envoys themselves (all

Romans than before one in which no negotiations had yet taken place. Sallust rightly avoided the pro-Sullan distortion.

⁸⁵ For a parallel to the Senate's response to Bocchus (as given by Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 104, 5) we refer to the Senate's reply to the Seleucid King Demetrius I Soter, that he would meet with benefactions from the Romans *ἐὰν τὸ ἰκανὸν ποιῆ συγκλήτῳ*, "if he did what the Senate considered appropriate" (*Pol.* 32, 3, 13; cf. *Diod.* 31, 30 where the adjectives *σκολιάς* καὶ *δυσέυρετος*, "ambiguous and difficult to interpret", are applied to the Senate's response: for Keaveney, however, in Jugurtha's case "the implication ... was obvious" – [above n. 36], 21). We note especially that the Senate in Demetrius' case did not leave the decision as to the appropriateness of the foreign King's acts to any Roman commander. Cf. in addition the Senate's reply to the Numidian prince Vermina who sought a treaty with Rome during the Second Punic War. The Senate responded that he must first seek peace with the Roman people and that Roman envoys would shortly meet with him – carrying instructions from the Senate (*Livy.* 31, 11, 13–18; 19, 5). As a general rule the Senate preserved its paramount rôle in conducting foreign policy and concluding treaties and certainly did not proclaim that it would abide by local commanders' decisions in these matters (as *Diod.* 34/35, 39 would have us believe): the spectacular fate of C. Mancinus (who under great duress made a treaty with the Numantines in 137 B. C.) underscores this for the Senate not only repudiated his treaty, but also handed him over as a captive to the Numantines (*Plut. Ti. Gracchus.* 5–7, 3). More to the point, in 110 B. C. the Senate refused to acknowledge a treaty which the commander A. Postumius Albinus had made with Jugurtha (*Sallust, Bell. Iug.* 39, 3). Again, Sallust refuses to go along with an obvious distortion.

⁸⁶ We note that no other accounts – neither the pro-Sullan nor the anti-Sullan ones – make anything of Sulla's duplicity in this episode. For example, the pro-Sullan account in Plutarch conspicuously ascribes duplicity to Bocchus (who sends a public letter saying one thing, and a private one saying another), though none at all to Sulla. (Keaveney [above n. 36], 21/22, perhaps unsurprisingly, omits all reference to Sallust's representation of Sulla's duplicity as well whilst otherwise faithfully following Sallust's account.)

long dead), knew what exactly had passed between them. That precisely at such a juncture Sallust should take the opportunity to invent details which fit his view of Sulla as a master of deception⁸⁷ has its own peculiar significance.

Next, no-one really knew what Bocchus and Sulla had said to each other in that final interview; or indeed what Bocchus and Marius had already arranged betwixt themselves in the course of the negotiations. Anti-Sullan revisionism might take advantage of that to insist that Marius merely sent Sulla to receive Jugurtha after all had been arranged in advance. But Sallust here saw a broadsword with which he might deal a literary master-stroke and grasped it with both hands: Sulla sprang on the astonished Bocchus the proposal to surrender Jugurtha without any previous consultation with Marius.⁸⁸ After all, Sallust had stated of Sulla in 95,4 that one could hardly judge whether to view Sulla as *fortis*, “bold, audacious”, or *felix*, “lucky, divinely favoured”, in his successes. A better illustration of Sulla’s audacity (making the proposal in Bocchus’ camp, with Jugurtha nearby and Roman troops far, far away) and good fortune (Bocchus actually acquiesced in the proposal) one might only with difficulty imagine.⁸⁹ Finally, no-one could easily refute any of this; and it fit perfectly not just with Sallust’s presentation of Sulla, but also with what everyone (including Sallust) knew of Sulla’s later reputation for bold strokes which, by luck, succeeded. Sulla had himself emphasised his “luck”⁹⁰ and had even taken the agnomen *Felix*.

⁸⁷ Paul (above n. 23), 237, also argues that Sallust’s use of this scene provides an illustration of Sulla’s capacity for deception. (Plut. Sulla, 28,1–6, provides, incidentally, a comparandum, so Sallust clearly did not invent Sulla’s ability to deceive wholecloth.)

⁸⁸ Paul (above n. 23), 251, wonders if the placement of the demand for Jugurtha’s surrender this late (against all historical probability: how likely is it that it had never occurred to Marius to ask for Jugurtha’s surrender?) be some literary contrivance. Although even on Sallust’s presentation one might imagine Marius’ having previously given instructions to Sulla, to make this demand if Bocchus seemed receptive, Sallust himself gives no hint that one should imagine this, historically plausible though it be. We note finally that even in the pro-Sullan account in Plutarch Bocchus had already conceived of the idea of surrendering Jugurtha and had mentioned this to Marius before meeting with Sulla.

⁸⁹ Paul (above n. 23), 252/253, observes that Sulla’s journey to Bocchus illustrates his *fortuna* and *fortitudo*, but does not point out that the same applies to the success which crowned the journey as well: Bocchus actually did deliver Jugurtha when Sulla proposed this.

⁹⁰ The Memoirs (see esp. HRR 1, 197/198, fr. 8 = Plut. Sulla, 6,7–13) made “luck” or “fortune” the guiding light of Sulla’s remarkable career: divine portents on this presentation inspired all his most successful acts. Sulla concluded this, however, only in retrospect; and we have many indications that his self-justification at the time of his acts differed from his mature views. For example, when Sulla marched on Rome for the first time in 88 B. C., he apparently claimed that he was doing so to rescue the *res publica* from malefactors who had oppressed many citizens and sent them into exile (alleged letter of Sulla’s cited at Appian, Bell. Ciuile, 1, 77; cf. Plut. Sulla, 34, 1/2, where those whom Sulla rescued

But it had all begun in Numidia when, to end the Jugurthine War, Sulla slipped in and achieved the event which allowed for victory. The qualities which enabled Sulla to do this were precisely those qualities which on Sallust's view, we submit, helped him to achieve victory in the later Civil Wars and eventually to become *dictator* of Rome: a mix of fortune and audacity, a silver tongue and an unfathomable capacity for deception.

V. Conclusion

As should have become unfortunately apparent by now, all too little of Sallust's presentation has decisive probative utility for modern historical reconstruction.⁹¹ We hasten to add, however, that we do not intend to assert that Sallust's version lacks all historical plausibility; and certainly not that the opposite to his presentation is true instead. We mean only that Sallust's words move almost entirely within the literary sphere and merely place one additional layer upon the earlier layers of Marian counter-revisionism and initial Sullan revisionism.⁹² But that realisation does at least allow us to ask one farther question, namely that as to Sallust's purpose in constructing his narrative of the surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla.

First, and obviously, Sallust follows the tradition that the surrender ended the war. As soon as Sulla takes possession of Jugurtha the book ends. Second, and equally obviously, Sallust credited Sulla – and solely Sulla – with achieving Jugurtha's surrender. Does this mean that Sallust subscribed to the view that Marius failed to end the war? Superficially he did not, since he ended his account with the mention of Marius' triumph. But Marius' triumph resulted, in Sallust's view, entirely from Marius' military ability – as Sallust in careful comparison with Metellus' had established. Unfortunately, not military ability ended the war. Rather, one aristocrat's eloquence (a typically aristocratic virtue on Sallust's presentation) and determined capacity for deception (a quality⁹³ which Sallust attributes to two aristocrats, Scaurus and Sulla) succeeded where military virtue alone had failed.

from villains in 88 B. C. marched in his triumph in 83 B. C.). In his Memoirs we find no such thing; rather, he received the appropriate omens from on high and thereupon promptly marched on Rome (positing, granted, that Plut. Sulla, 9, 5–8 reflects the Memoirs).

⁹¹ Surely one may accept that Sulla was the Roman officer who received Jugurtha from Bocchus as that no-one ever bothered to deny. Sulla probably did have some hand in the negotiations which led up to the surrender, but Marius' partisans could and did dispute the extent of his involvement.

⁹² Historical reconstruction of the events in question in our opinion will largely have to remain in each historian's estimation of the general probability of a given occurrence.

⁹³ Leeman (above n. 27), 23, calls it an "Optimaten-Untugend".

Here we must refer again to Metellus. He had actually tried to end the war by achieving Jugurtha's surrender by diplomacy; yet he had failed in this.⁹⁴ Marius exceeded Metellus in point of military ability, but – on Sallust's presentation⁹⁵ – had never tried to capture Jugurtha by negotiation with Jugurtha's allies and friends. Marius (like Sulla) benefited from divine favour and displayed audacity in his undertakings. Yet Sulla had eloquence as well and, what is more, the ability to deceive. And that won out in the end.

Next, Sallust wrote the final chapters of the *Bellum Iugurthinum* (as should have become clear from the above) in the context of an historiographical debate which (to some degree) he expected his readers to know. Much of the debate had turned on the ending of the war through Jugurtha's surrender, and in part because of this Sallust felt constrained to offer his version of that story and spent over a tenth of his pamphlet doing so. But most importantly, Sallust composed those chapters in the full knowledge of Sulla's victory in the Civil Wars when Marius and his partisans suffered defeat and total eclipse. Accordingly, Sallust arranged his account to magnify Sulla's rôle so that he would, by the end, almost overshadow Marius. Thus, since Sulla relies heavily on deception, he appears to contrive to steal the credit for the victory from Marius. This is not an "appreciation of Sulla's alert diplomacy" as Sir Ronald Syme would have one believe: it is a harbinger of things to come.⁹⁶

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⁹⁴ Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 61/62.

⁹⁵ Cf. above n. 89.

⁹⁶ Cf. Wille (above n. 1), 312: "Wie [Sulla] in Sallusts Darstellung hinter Marius auftaucht, weckt die Erinnerung an die späteren Ereignisse des Bürgerkriegs." That Sallust, in the final section of the *Bellum Iugurthinum*, should look forward to the end of the first round of the civil wars should hardly surprise (see section I of this article). At any rate Steidle (above n. 4), 34, noted long ago: "Der Parteikampf ... [spielt] für die Gestaltung der gesamten Monographie bis zu ihrem Ende eine Rolle; die Interpretation wird gerade auf diesen Punkt besondere Aufmerksamkeit richten müssen."