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## Demades' Natural Flair for Rhetoric Some Notes on the Extant Herculanean Evidence\*

*Summary* – This paper examines and summarizes the extant Herculanean pieces of evidence for Demades, a successful Athenian orator of the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C. who, according to several sources, did not study the art of rhetoric but succeeded by dint of hard work and experience in addition to natural talent. In this field a new testimonium to Demades, handed down by PHerc. 1004, is to be taken into account. Two aspects appear to stand out: the substantial pointlessness of rhetoric and the political failure of the Athenian orator before (or during) the Macedonian-Greek conflict. In anticipation of a new comprehensive edition of PHerc. 1004, a comparison of this testimonium with the other references to Demades in the Herculanean papyri gives us further clues for understanding the reasons behind this topical reference.

The aim of these notes is to provide an updated list of the testimonia to Demades in the Herculanean papyri. As a matter of fact, the last papyrological, philological, and historico-philosophical research on PHerc. 1004 has brought to light, among other discoveries, a new testimonium to this important 4<sup>th</sup>-century B.C. Athenian orator.<sup>1</sup> PHerc. 1004 consists of a Herculanean roll containing an unknown book of Philodemus' multi-volume treatise *On Rhetoric*. The most recent studies on its bibliological reconstruction have clearly shown that almost one-third of it still remained unpublished in Siegfried Sudhaus' edition.<sup>2</sup> The discovery of the new piece of evidence

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\* The English translations of the Herculanean passages quoted below are my own. The text of col. 76 Ranocchia-Vassallo (hereafter R.-V.) of PHerc. 1004 was established by Graziano Ranocchia and myself during our cooperation for a new critical edition of PHerc. 1004. It appears now as the outcome of an international workshop on the unpublished columns of this papyrus, held in Sorrento on September 12<sup>th</sup>–14<sup>th</sup>, 2013 and funded by the ERC-Starting Grant 241184-PHerc, with the participation, among others, of David Armstrong, David Blank, Daniel Delattre, Jürgen Hammerstaedt, W. Benjamin Henry, Richard Janko, and Francesca Longo Auricchio.

<sup>1</sup> In this regard, see Vassallo (2015), and the online critical text at <http://www.pherc.eu/publications.html> (see there also the *conspectus siglorum* and the *conspectus signorum* of the edition along with the diplomatic transcription of col. 76 R.-V.). Relevant testimonia to Homer, Socrates, Aristoxenos, and Bion of Borysthenes are noteworthy.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ranocchia (2016a).

was made possible thanks to the correct replacement of a large ‘sovrapposto’ detected through autopsy and transcription of the original manuscript, in the fifth of the fourteen ‘cornici’ in which PHerc. 1004 is today preserved at the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi of the National Library ‘Vittorio Emanuele III’ in Naples.<sup>3</sup> The placement of the ‘sovrapposto’ allows the name of Demades to be read in the following passage:

*desunt versus fere 21*

..... οὐκ ἄν] φήσαις  
 .....(.) συ]μφέρει  
 [. (. .)] [. .] ρωσ [. . . .] πειθειν  
 ..(.)ε [. . . .] γω[. .] διδο-  
 5 [. . . . .] ἐπιθυμῆ  
 .....] . ειν μῆ εἰ-  
 δό[τι οὐκ] αὐτ[ῶι σ]υμφέρει  
 τάχα γὰρ θα[νά]σιμόν  
 τι αἰτήσει, ὥστ' αὐτῶι  
 10 τὸν θεὸν θάνα[τ]ον ἐ-  
 νεγκεῖν· οὐδὲ γ[ὰ]ρ τοὺς ἐ-  
 αυτοῦ πολίτας ἔνια συμ-  
 φέρει πείθειν Δημάδη, {ρ} ἐ-  
 πει καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ  
 15 τὴν Μακεδόνων δύνα-  
 μιν υφί ρουσ [. . . . .], κα-  
 κ[ῶ]ς ἐλέγχε[ι . . . . .(.)]. εἰ  
 .....(.)]τηι  
 .....]ε  
 20 .....]βαν  
 21 .....]..η

PHerc. 1004, cr. 4, pz. 1, col. g et superpos. in cr. 5, pz. 4 inter coll. 73 et 74 collocatum 1 ] . . . . .<sup>+1</sup> subter lineam vert. apicata, inf. vert., inf. arcus 2 ]μφορει<sup>+1</sup> 3 [. (. .)] [. inf. duo arcus se tangentes, (π, η, γ, ι) ]ρωσ [. . . .] . . . . θειν<sup>+1</sup> sup. horiz., sup. horiz., sin. sup. arcus, sup. vert. et inf. vest. 4 ε [ dext. arcus ]γω[. .] διδο<sup>+1</sup> desc. vel arcus 5 [. (μ, ν) ]επιθυμε<sup>+1</sup> inf. vert. 6 ] . . . . . εινμ . . .<sup>+1</sup> vert., dext. sup. horiz. apicata, (η, κ, ν), (ε, σ) 7 . . . . . (δ, β), (ο, ω, σ) ]υμφορει<sup>+1</sup> 8 αχα α inf. vert. cum horiz. coniuncta, (γ, τ, ι) ]σιμον<sup>+1</sup> 9 . . . . . αιτη . ε inf. vert., inf. vert., (σ, ε, ξ) αυται<sup>+1</sup> 10 . ι (τ, π) ]ονε<sup>+1</sup> 11 ε . [ (γ, π) ] . . . . . τρυσε<sup>+1</sup> (ρ, β) 12 υμ<sup>+1</sup> 13 ρ . . . . . π (ε, σ, ο, θ), inf. vert. ]ρ .<sup>+1</sup> (ε, η) 14 θ . ν (η, κ, γ, π, ι, ν) . . . . . σο .<sup>+1</sup> (υ, κ), sup. vest. 15 ρ . . . . . ν (ν, π, γι, ιτ), dext. arcus υνα<sup>+1</sup> 16 ι . ρος [ sup. vest., (η, χ) ]κα<sup>+1</sup> 17 ] . . . . . γχ . [ (κ, χ, σ), (ε, σ), med. vest., (κ, ν, ε),

<sup>3</sup> See infra, the palaeographical apparatus of col. 76 R.-V.'s edition.

(ο, ε, θ) ] ε<sup>+</sup> (π, γ, τ) 18 ]π<sup>+</sup> 19 ]ε<sup>+</sup> 20 ]β<sup>+</sup> 21 ] . η<sup>+</sup> (κ, η), dext.  
inf. horiz. vel desc.

PHerc. 1004, col. 76 R.-V. primum edidimus 1 οὐκ ἄν] suppl. Janko per verba 6–7 μὴ  
ἐἰδός[τι vel μὴ ἐἰδός[τα leg. ac suppl. Hammerstaedt per verba: μὴ ἐἰδός[σιν Henry per verba  
7 ἀτ[ῶι legimus ac supplevimus: ἀτ[οῖς Henry per verba 9 τί αἰτήσῃ vel καὶ τήξῃ leg.  
Hammerstaedt per verba 11 γ[ά]ρ leg. ac suppl. Henry per verba 13–14 ἐ[πεί leg.  
McOsker per verba 14 οἷ leg. Janko per verba

“(c. 21 lines and 2–3 words missing) you would [not] say (c. 2–3 words missing) [it] is  
useful (c. 3–4 words missing) to persuade/[not let] persuade (c. 3–4 words missing) to give  
(c. 1–2 words missing) [he] desires (c. 2–3 words missing) [it is not] useful to him, if he  
does not know [it]: as a matter of fact, perhaps he will ask (scil. gods?) for something deadly,  
so that the god has given him death; for it is not useful for Demades to try to persuade his  
fellow-citizens, since he harshly refutes even the Athenians, who (c. 2 words missing) the  
power of [the] Macedonians (c. 2–3 words missing) he refutes ineffectively (c. 1–2 words  
and 4 lines missing)”

In *On Rhetoric*'s unknown book handed down by PHerc. 1004, Philodemus deals in a systematic way with the problem of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Here the polemical arguments can be divided into three parts in relation to the different opponents, whose opinions are widely paraphrased by the Epicurean philosopher. The famous and well-known speech on (and against) Diogenes of Babylon<sup>5</sup> is followed by that concerning Aristo (as supposed for the first time by Hans von Arnim)<sup>6</sup> and preceded by a long opening section, which, as mentioned earlier, is still largely unpublished; with regard to the philosophical addressee of this section, we can for the moment only put forward some hypotheses.<sup>7</sup> The col. 76 R.-V. belongs to this introductory section of PHerc. 1004. Unfortunately, the initial lines of the column are full of gaps. This fact prevents us from stating with a reasonable degree of certainty whether Philodemus is speaking here for himself or whether he is continuing to report the thoughts of his opponent. The reading of the verb ἐπιθυμέω at line 5 (ἐπιθυμεῖ), together with the verb

<sup>4</sup> For the latest bibliography on this topic, see Erbi (2009); Erbi (2011); Vassallo (2015); Ranocchia (2016b).

<sup>5</sup> PHerc. 1004, cols. 85–149 R.-V. (= fr. XII, col. LXXI Sudhaus).

<sup>6</sup> PHerc. 1004, cols. 149–186 R.-V. (= cols. LXXI–CVIII Sudhaus). Cf. von Arnim (1900), 5.

<sup>7</sup> Here I will just say that a very plausible ‘candidate’ is the Greek preacher Bion of Borysthenes (4<sup>th</sup>–3<sup>rd</sup> centuries B.C.). As for the textual border between Diogenes’ and Aristo’s sections, and for the difficult historico-philosophical problems raised by them (mainly the question of Aristo’s identity, viz. the Stoic Aristo of Chios or the Peripatetic Aristo of Ceos), cf. Ranocchia (2016b).

συμφέρω at lines 2 and 7 (συ]μφέρει ... σ]υμφέρει) give good reasons for arguing that the Herculanean text tackles the problem of the effects of the rhetorician's mood on the success or failure of his speech. Betraying an irrational desire in his own words, the rhetorician is condemned to failure or even to death as a consequence of his supposed act of ὕβρις.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the reference to Demades at lines 11ff. of this column forms part of a polemical speech whose main topic is articulated very clearly: the city has no use for rhetoric, and the power of persuasion is substantially ineffective in the concrete circumstances of political life. On account of the absence of *oratio obliqua*, we can suppose that in the second part of the column Philodemus himself is speaking. Is he trying to explain his point of view on this topic or simply summarizing the weak points of the opponent's arguments, which he has already paraphrased?

Demades was one of the most fervent supporters of the philo-Macedonian party over a large historical period, from the apogee of Philip II of Macedon to the fall of Alexander the Great. On several occasions he tried (sometimes with success, though also suffering some defeats<sup>9</sup>) to convince the Athenians not to obstinately oppose the Macedonians; Demosthenes, however, unceasingly advocated bold opposition. According to late sources, Demades was a humble sailor.<sup>10</sup> But in contrast, a contemporary text speaks about the ship of Demades' father;<sup>11</sup> thus, he was not a simple sailor (πορθμεύς or κωπηλάτης), but probably, like his father, a ναύκληρος or ἔμπορος.<sup>12</sup> Obviously, he was not a poor, uneducated man. We know enough about Athenian orators to conclude that if Demades had been poor at the beginning of his public career, many orators (Hyperides and Deinarchos, for instance) would have highlighted his background and would have taken his poor origins as a sign of corruption, as Demosthenes did with Aeschines. It is also important to note that Demades' alleged lack of education and his remarkable rhetorical ability (mentioned by Theophrastus, his contemporary) poses a contradiction. His natural flair for rhetoric was, for later Hellenistic scholars (probably

<sup>8</sup> Asking a god for something deadly certainly represents an act of impiety not only for the subject of such a speech, but above all for its addressee. In this case the punishment inflicted by the god on an impious rhetorician is death. This is probably an allusion to an unspecified Greek myth.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. De Falco (1954<sup>2</sup>), 21–29, comm. to Demad., frs. 6–26 De Falco; Brun (2000), 55–112.

<sup>10</sup> Sext., Adv. math. II 16 Mutschmann; Suda, s.v. Δημάδης, 415.

<sup>11</sup> Polyeuktos of Sphettos, quoted by Rhet. gr. IX, 545 Walz. Cf. Gauthier (1985), 109/110.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Davies (1971), 99/100.

including Philodemus), the only possible explanation for resolving this contradiction. Furthermore, a significant Greek inscription (IG, II 2, 1623, ll. 160–189) shows that Demades was rich and anti-Macedonian enough in 341 B. C. to give money to the Chalcidians against a Macedonian attempt in Euboea.<sup>13</sup> Even though he never published his orations, Demades succeeded through his natural eloquence both in making his way in the political life of Athens and in getting on the right side of Philip II when he was made prisoner during the battle of Chaeronea (338 B. C.). In this period he even inspired the following peace negotiations.<sup>14</sup> As a matter of fact, we know that after Chaeronea, Philip sent Demades to Athens in order to convince the Athenians to stipulate a peace treaty with him. On that occasion, Demades delivered his strongest speech against Demosthenes, charging him with leading Athens to ruin because of his mistaken foreign policy.<sup>15</sup> One possible explanation for the reference to Demades in PHerc. 1004 can be found through the comparison of this new testimonium with the other three pieces of evidence for Demades appearing within Philodemus' treatise *On Rhetoric*. In these last testimonia, as we will see shortly, Demades (along with Aeschines, who like him was a self-taught, philo-Macedonian and an opponent of Demosthenes) is recalled as an example of an amateur rhetorician, who nonetheless was able to persuade the audience thanks to his natural flair for rhetoric. Obviously, this problem is part of the wider debate on rhetoric as a τέχνη and on its relationship with φύσις. In Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates summarizes this issue with the following statement:<sup>16</sup>

τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὅστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλειον γενέσθαι, εἰκός – ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον – ἔχειν ὡσπερ τάλλα· εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῶ εἶναι, ἔση ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλείπῃς τούτων, ταύτη ἀτελεῖς ἔση.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Brun (2000), 44–48.

<sup>14</sup> On Demades' relationship with Demosthenes, whose death penalty decree was specifically proposed by Demades, cf. Kroll (1940), cols. 1039–1138; De Falco (1954), 89–101; Brun (2000), *passim*; on Demosthenes in Philodemus, cf. Cooper (2000), 224–245; Erbi (2008), 193–219. Quite similar to the case of Demades is that of the architect Philo of Eleusis (4<sup>th</sup> century B. C.), who made the renowned arsenal in Piraeus and was able to advertise it thanks to his great eloquence, as we can read in Philod., *Rhet. IV*, PHerc. 1007/1673, col. XI<sup>a</sup>, 1–4 Sudhaus (I, 192), and Cic., *De orat. I* 14, 62 Kumaniecki. On this last point, cf. Hubbell (1920), 380.

<sup>15</sup> Demad., fr. 1 De Falco (= Aristot., *Rhet. B* 24, 1401b29 Ross; Anonym., in Aristot. *Rhet.*, CArG XXI 2, 151, 30 Rabe; cf. Dion. Hal., *Amm.* 12, I, 275, 20ff. Usener - Radermacher).

<sup>16</sup> Plat., *Phaedr.* 269d2–6 Moreschini.

“As for the ability to acquire it, Phaedrus, so as to become a complete performer, probably – perhaps even necessarily – the matter is as it is in all other cases: if it is naturally in you to be a good orator, a notable orator you will be, when you have got knowledge and practice besides, and whatever you lack of these, you will be incomplete in this respect.”<sup>17</sup>

This topic was tackled several times by the Peripatetic school. Apart from the new fragment in PHerc. 1004, all the Philodemean testimonia to Demades deal with the relationship between art and nature in the rhetorical field. In this regard, Philodemus’ position seems to be clear enough: it is no doubt true what the Peripatetic Critolaus maintains, viz. that the cases of Demades and Aeschines show how φύσις plays an important role in the success of the rhetorician; however, upon a closer look, it is also true that φύσις, although rendering τέχνη more efficient, could never be a substitute for it. This is a position very similar to that expressed by Plato’s Phaedrus. Therefore, for Philodemus, rhetoric cannot be reduced to praxis and exercise, but, at the same time, it could never exist apart from them. In this respect, the passage of On Rhetoric’s unknown book transmitted by PHerc. 409, fr. VIII Sudhaus (II, 97/98 = Critol., fr. 28 Wehrli), is particularly significant.<sup>18</sup> Here, the Epicurean philosopher begins deliberately with the theory of Critolaus, who maintained that only what has a useful aim can be considered an art.<sup>19</sup>

ὡς πλουσιομαχοῦντ’ Αἰ[σχί]νην  
 μὴ δεδιδάχθαι· σαφῶς [γ]ὰρ λέγει,  
 ὅτι Δημάδης οὐκ ἔμαθ[εν] ὡς  
 δ’ αὐτῶς Αἰσχίνης ἦτοι κ[αὶ] πα-  
 5 ρ’ ἄλλων ἢ δι’ αὐτῶν τὰ με[θοδι]-

<sup>17</sup> Transl. by Ch. J. Rowe. On this passage, cf. de Vries (1969), 15–18; 232, where it is noted that “these lines contain an allusion to Isocrates, *Contra soph.* 16–18” and that “the combination φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, μελέτη is traditional.” See also Rowe (<sup>2</sup>1988), 203/204.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. De Falco (<sup>2</sup>1954), 14/15.

<sup>19</sup> Critol., frs. 25–39 Wehrli, on which cf. Wehrli (<sup>2</sup>1969), 53–58. See von Arnim (1898), 89/90; Isnardi Parente (1966), 386; Ferrario (1980), 62–64. On the basis of our current knowledge, besides PHerc. 409, fr. VIII Sudhaus (II, 97/98) / PHerc. 425, fr. VIII Sudhaus (II, 103) [= fr. 28 Wehrli], the Herculanean testimonia more or less directly related to Critolaus all derive from Philodemus’ On Rhetoric: PHerc. 425, fr. IV Sudhaus (II, 101) / PHerc. 1573, fr. III Sudhaus (II, 68) [= fr. 27 Wehrli]; PHerc. 425, fr. VII Sudhaus (II, 102) [= fr. 29 Wehrli]; PHerc. 1506, fr. IV Sudhaus (II, 197) [= fr. 30 Wehrli]; PHerc. 1506, col. XV Sudhaus (II, 220) [= fr. 31 Wehrli]; PHerc. 1078 et 1080, fr. XIII Sudhaus (II, 154) [= fr. 35 Wehrli]; PHerc. 1506, fr. XIII Sudhaus (II, 200) [= fr. 36 Wehrli]; PHerc. 1506, fr. VI Sudhaus (II, 198) [= fr. 38 Wehrli]; PHerc. 425, fr. Xb Sudhaus (II, 104) [= fr. 39 Wehrli].

- καὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς οὐτ' ἄ[πλατα  
 τὸ πλῆθος ὄντα προσκα[ρτερήσεώς  
 τε πολλῆς οὐ δεόμενα· τ[ὸν μὲν  
 γὰρ Δημοσθένην πάν[τες κε-  
 10 κράγασιν οἱ κατ' αὐτὸν τεχνί[την  
 εἶναι, καὶ Κριτόλα[ος οὐκ ἀπαρ-  
 νε[ῖται· [ὁ]χυροὶ δὲ προσέτι τ[ὸ λε-  
 γόμενον ὕφ' ἡμῶν α[ὐ]τ[ῶν  
 μικρὰ παρ[ὰ] τῆς τέ[χνης] αὐτ[οὺς  
 15 εἰληφέναι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ “τὰς  
 εἰκ[οβολ]ίας [οὐ]κ ὀρ[θοβο]λεῖν [εἰ  
 μή που] σπανίως,” Αἰσχ[ίν]ην δ[ὲ  
 δηλ]ονότι κα[ὶ] Δημάδη[ν συν-  
 εχῶς ὀρθοβολεῖν μήπ[ο]τε [οὐ  
 20 συνακτικ[ὸν φη]ι τις τοῦ τέχνην  
 τ[αὐτ]ην ὑπά[ρχ]ειν τ[ῆς] ῥ[η]τ[ορικῆς].<sup>20</sup>

“... as Aeschines, who fights against the rich, has received any [rhetorical] instruction. Because he (*scil.* Critolaus) clearly maintains that Demades, and in the same way Aeschines, did not learn either from others or by themselves rhetoric’s methodological principles, which are not excessively numerous and do not need too much perseverance. As a matter of fact, all [his] contemporaries proclaimed Demosthenes to be an artist (*scil.* a rhetorician), and Critolaus does not deny [it]. Furthermore, what we have said is supported by the fact that they (*scil.* Demades and Aeschines) learned little from the art. For one could not say that [the ancient proverb according to which] ‘firing at random hits the mark but rarely,’ while Aeschines and Demades evidently hit the mark consistently, leads one to conclude that this art of rhetoric [really] exists.”<sup>21</sup>

From these words we can infer that Critolaus did not deny that sometimes the possession of art could help men to become successful orators, as occurred in the case of Demosthenes. But we could also extend the Philodemian paraphrasis of Critolaus to the examples quoted immediately before: that is, of Demades and Aeschines as self-taught rhetoricians.<sup>22</sup> In this case,

<sup>20</sup> As for lines 2–21, I follow here the few changes of Sudhaus’ text made by Erbi (2008), 209. Cf. also PHerc. 425, frs. VII/VIII Sudhaus (II, 102/103), on which see the previous note.

<sup>21</sup> The proverb at lines 15–17 was already detected by Longo Auricchio (1984), 462/463, n. 70, while it is not identified in the most recent translation of the passage provided by Erbi (2008), 210.

<sup>22</sup> So Hubbell (1920), 371.

the apparent ‘praise’ of Demosthenes by Critolaus would be nothing but an elegant way of denying to rhetoric the dignity of τέχνη. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the sources at our disposal, Critolaus considered rhetoric as κακοτεχνία and mere τριβή. Namely, in his view, rhetoric would have been not an art, but a practice: that is, unteachable, not necessary for acquiring eloquence, aiming to deceive the audience, and thus totally useless for society.<sup>23</sup> Both Frank Olivier<sup>24</sup> and Wilhelm Kroll<sup>25</sup> argued that such an anti-rhetorical attitude must bear Platonic influence, as this view seems to be rather surprising for a Peripatetic philosopher of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C.<sup>26</sup> According to the Herculanean text, Critolaus denied rhetoric the character of ἐπιστήμη through the examples of those who became rhetoricians without studying rhetorical art.<sup>27</sup> In Ludwig Radermacher’s opinion, this passage of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric represents one of the elements establishing Critolaus as the source of two major testimonia by Quintilianus and Sextus Empiricus on the same topic.<sup>28</sup> In book 2 of Institutes of Oratory we read the following:

*Ita, si rhetorice vocari debet sermo quicumque, fuisse eam antequam esset ars confitebor: si vero non quisquis loquitur orator est, et tum non tamquam oratores loquebantur, necesse est oratorem factum arte nec ante artem fuisse fateantur. Quo illud quodque excluditur quod dicunt, non esse artis id quod faciat qui non didicerit: dicere autem homines et qui non didicerint. Ad cuius rei confirmationem adferunt Demaden remigem et Aeschinen hypocriten oratores fuisse. Falso: nam neque orator esse qui non didicit potest, et hos sero potius quam numquam didicisse quis dixerit, quamquam Aeschines ab initio sit versatus in litteris, quas pater eius etiam docebat, Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit et continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum quantuscumque postea fuit fecisse; nam id potentissimum discendi*

<sup>23</sup> Brittain (2001), 301, n. 10, who, in addition to Quintilianus (Inst. or. II 15,23; 20,2 Winterbottom) and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. II 12; 16 Mutschmann), quotes the two Philodemian passages, which are admittedly fragmentary and difficult to interpret, transmitted by PHerc. 1573, fr. III Sudhaus (II, 67–69), and PHerc. 425, fr. IV Sudhaus (II, 101). Cf. supra, n. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Olivier (1895), 51/52.

<sup>25</sup> Kroll (1940), col. 1084.

<sup>26</sup> This is because, as Brittain (2001), 301, n. 10, observes, “the Peripatetics had continued to be interested in rhetoric after Aristotle, at least until Hieronymus of Rhodes.”

<sup>27</sup> On this point, see again Olivier (1895), 32; Mayer (1907–1910), 514; 533/534. In general, as regards Critolaus’ position on rhetoric, cf. frs. 25–39 Wehrli and the corresponding commentary of Wehrli (<sup>2</sup>1969), 69–73.

<sup>28</sup> Radermacher (1895), XII–XVI.



*genus est. Sed et praestantiorem si didicisset futurum fuisse dicere licet: neque enim orationes scribere est ausus, ut eum multum valuisse in dicendo sciamus.*<sup>29</sup>

“So if any speech whatever is to be called ‘rhetoric’, then I must agree that rhetoric existed before there was an art; but if it is not true that everyone who speaks is an orator, and people did not speak like orators in those days, then they must admit that the orator is produced by art, and did not exist before art. This also rules out their argument that anything done by a man who has not learned it cannot be an achievement of art, and yet there are men who can make speeches without having learned. In support of this view they adduce the fact that Demades the rower and Aeschines the actor were both orators. This is false reasoning: no man can be an orator who has not learned, and it is better to suppose that these men learned late than they never learned, though in fact Aeschines was well versed in literature from his childhood, since his father was actually a teacher; as for Demades, it is not certain that he never learned, and continual practice could very well have made him what he came to be, for that is in fact the most effective way of learning. On the other hand, one can say that he would have been more outstanding if he had learned; for he never ventured to write down his speeches, though we know he delivered them with great effect.”<sup>30</sup>

By using a similar approach, Sextus writes:

Οὐκ ἄρα τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορική. εἴπερ τε ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι ῥήτορα μὴ μετασχόντα τῆς ῥητορικῆς τέχνης, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τέχνη ῥητορική. ἐνδέχεται δέ γε ἰκανῶς καὶ κατὰ τρόπον ῥητορεύειν μὴ μετασχόντα ῥητορικῆς, ὡς καὶ περὶ Δημάδου παρειλίψαμεν· κωπηλάτης γὰρ ὢν ὁμολογεῖται ἄριστος γεγονέναι ῥήτωρ, καὶ σὺν τούτῳ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς. τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἡ ῥητορική. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ τούτοις ἀπιστοῦμεν ὡς τοιοῦτοις γεγονόσι καὶ ἐν ἔξει κακῶς τοιαύτης τινὸς τριβῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ῥητορεύειν παρεληλυθόσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς βίῳ πολλοὺς πάρεστιν ὄρᾶν λέγοντας μὲν εὐφῶδες ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις, τὰ δὲ τεχνικὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς παραγγέλματα μὴ γινώσκοντας. καὶ ἀντιστρόφως, εἰ οἱ ἐξηκριβωκότες καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον

<sup>29</sup> Quint., *Inst. or.* II 17, 10–13 Winterbottom. On Demades as example of self-taught orator, besides Sextus Empiricus (nn. 10 and 31), see also Syr., in *Hermog.* II, 3, 15–23 Rabe; Max. Plan., 66, 14 Rabe (= Anonym., in *Arist. Rhet.*, *CArG* XXI 2, 199, 17 Rabe). On Demades’ habit of not publishing his speeches, cf. Quint., *Inst. or.* XII 10, 49 Winterbottom, and Cic., *Brut.* 9, 36 Malcovati. This last Ciceronian passage is considered to depend on Theophrastus’ *Περὶ λέξεως*: on this point, see Mayer (1910), 33–37 n.; De Falco (1954), 12. As we know, Theophrastus (*De eloc.*, fr. 706 FHS&G = Plut., *Dem.* 10, 2/3, 289, 15–24 Ziegler) made Demades superior to Demosthenes in eloquence. See Fortenbaugh (2005), 342–346.

<sup>30</sup> Transl. by D. A. Russell.

ἐκπονήσαντες τὸν τεχνικὸν τῆς ῥητορικῆς λόγον ἀδυνατοῦσι ῥητορεύειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων καὶ ἀγορᾶς, οὐ ῥητέον τεχνικὴν μέθοδον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.<sup>31</sup>

“Rhetoric, therefore, is not an art. Also, if it is possible to become an orator without being acquainted with the art of rhetoric, there will be no art of rhetoric. But it is possible to make a speech quite successfully and well without having studied rhetoric, as we have been told in the case of Demades; for though he was a boatman, it is agreed that he became a very fine orator; and besides him there are numerous other instances. Hence, rhetoric is not an art. Moreover, if we do not believe that these men were such as we have described and that they attained to oratory by experience and by practice, yet still we may see many in our daily life who speak admirably in the law-courts and assemblies though they have no knowledge of the technical rules of rhetoric. And conversely, if those who have studied closely and worked hard at the technique of rhetorical speech are incapable of making a speech at the law-courts and assembly, one must deny that rhetoric is a technical method.”<sup>32</sup>

August Mayer thought that the original source of the various judgements on Demades was Theophrastus and that here, in particular, Sextus accessed that source through Critolaus, mediated in his turn by Aristo of Ceus.<sup>33</sup> But it is well known that in these texts, especially in the Herculanean passages, scholars still disagree on the real identity of Aristo.<sup>34</sup> Both Fritz Wehrli and Harry M. Hubbell declared themselves against Radermacher’s theory (viz. Critolaus as the unique and direct source of Quintilianus and Sextus). Wehrli more prudently ascribed to Critolaus only lines 8–12 of PHerc. 409, fr. VIII Sudhaus.<sup>35</sup> Hubbell, in highly structural terms, tried instead to identify Philodemus’ sources in the rhetorical work of the Academic philosopher Charmadas.<sup>36</sup> In his opinion, we should first take into account that in Sextus’ treatise *Against the Rhetoricians* (Adv. math. II 20 = Critol., fr. 34 Wehrli), the names of the Academic philosophers Clitomachus and Charmadas appear near to Critolaus’ name. In this regard, Hubbell considers the testimonium on Charmadas, which we find in book I of Cicero’s *De oratore* within a long

<sup>31</sup> Sext., Adv. math. II 16–18 Mutschmann. Sextus, as he himself recalls, had already spoken about Demades in Adv. math. I 295 Mutschmann, namely the details of his capture during the battle of Chaeronea and of his alleged speech to Philip, in which he quoted Homer (Od. X 383–385). On this passage of Sextus’ treatise *Against the Grammarians*, see Barnes (1986), 9–14. Cf. also Blank (1998), XVII–LV, and 320/321; Spinelli (2010), 249–264.

<sup>32</sup> Transl. by R. G. Bury.

<sup>33</sup> Mayer (1907–1910), 514–522; so also De Falco (1954), 15.

<sup>34</sup> On this problem, cf. Ranocchia (2007), 67–207, esp. 196–201; Ranocchia (2016b).

<sup>35</sup> Wehrli (1969), 54 (= Critol., fr. 28 Wehrli).

<sup>36</sup> Hubbell (1920), 371–374. For a historico-philosophical account on Charmadas, cf. Dorandi (1991), 75/76; Dorandi (1994); Lévy (2005), 60–70; Fleischer (2014), 65–75; for an analysis of his rhetorical theories, cf. Tarrant (1985), 34–40; Brittain (2001), 319–328.

excursus of Marcus Antonius, extremely significant.<sup>37</sup> In this passage, among other things, Cicero narrates a (real or fictitious<sup>38</sup>) dialogue, which takes place in Athens and addresses the problem of whether eloquence is grounded in practice or in scientific knowledge. During this debate, the position of the Stoic philosopher Mnesarchus (who contemptuously defines the orators of his time as *operarios lingua celeri et exercitata* and maintains that only the wise man can be a true orator) is further developed by Charmadas. In the view of the Academic philosopher, nobody could completely reach the *facultas dicendi* before studying in depth the *philosophorum inventa*. In other words, there is no rhetoric without philosophy. Against the weak objections of Menedemos (an otherwise unknown rhetorician), Charmadas replies that his equation between rhetoric and philosophy does not intend to deny either the extraordinary competence and eloquence of an orator such as Demosthenes,<sup>39</sup> or – what is the most important point – the fact that natural flair (*quod ita nati essemus*) could also allow amateur rhetoricians, completely devoid of appropriate theoretical training, to achieve the ultimate aim of rhetoric, viz. persuasion of an audience (*quod consuetudo exercitatioque et intellegendi prudentiam acueret et eloquendi celeritatem incitaret*). At this point, Cicero says that within Charmadas' speech a large sequence of famous examples followed. But, among them, only the alleged pioneers of rhetoric are textually quoted: Corax and Tisias.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, within *De oratore* there is no direct reference to Demades or Aeschines, and it seems that only this fact distinguishes Cicero's passage from those of Philodemus, Quintilianus, and Sextus Empiricus quoted above. According to Hubbell, the failure to mention Demades and Aeschines can be attributed to Cicero's goal of fitting the sources at his disposal to a Roman audience: "... Antonius is represented as one who looks with mild contempt on the learning of the Greeks. Hence the scornful *nescio quo* with which he dismisses Corax and Tisias. It is in keeping with this assumed indifference

<sup>37</sup> Cic., *De orat.* I 18–21 Kumaniecki.

<sup>38</sup> In the opinion of Hubbell (1920), 372, "the incident may be true, or more likely, merely a fiction designed to establish a personal connection between Cicero and Charmadas from whose published works he is drawing the material for his argument," according to a paraphrastic technique not unknown in Cicero's dialogues (*ibid.*, n. 8). Cf. Kennedy (1972), 214–220; Leeman-Pinkster (1981), 67–70; 86–96; May-Wisse (2001), 17/18; Wisse (2002), 377; 390.

<sup>39</sup> A similar acknowledgement of Demosthenes' value can also be found in PHerc. 409, fr. VIII Sudhaus. Cf. *supra*.

<sup>40</sup> See Pernot (2006), 23–25; and, with a critical view toward all theories regarding a pre-Platonic birth of rhetoric, Cole (1986); Cole (1991), 22–27.

that he sums up the examples of Charmadas with *innumerabilis quosdam*. In place of these Greek examples [*scil.* Demades and Aeschines] he makes Charmadas substitute a Roman example, Antonius himself.”<sup>41</sup>

As already mentioned, in Philodemus’ *On Rhetoric* we find two other pieces of evidence which refer, more or less directly, to Demades.<sup>42</sup> These passages must be taken into account as well to better understand how this Epicurean philosopher makes use of the tradition praising Demades’ natural flair for rhetoric. In book 2 of this treatise, Philodemus (most probably speaking in the first person) warns that:

πᾶσα τέχνη, “τὸ δ’ εἰκοβολεῖν οὐκ ὀρ-  
 θοβολεῖ πλὴν εἴ που σπανίως,” ῥή-  
 τoras δὲ δεινούς γεγονότας ἄ-  
 4 νευ μαθήσεως παρειλίφαμεν.<sup>43</sup>

“... [is it (*scil.* rhetoric?)] entirely an art, while ‘firing at random hits the mark but rarely,’ yet we know that there have existed capable rhetoricians who were nonetheless lacking in instruction.”

While in book 3, paraphrasing his Stoic opponent Diogenes of Babylon, he writes:

10 Δημάδην ἄγοντ[α] τοὺς ἐ-  
 αυτῷ παραβάλλειν θέλον-  
 τας ἐπὶ τὸν διδάσκαλον,  
 13 τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τὸ[ν] δῆμον.<sup>44</sup>

“... Demades, who used to bring to [his] teacher, those who wanted to be his followers, that is, the people.”

<sup>41</sup> Hubbell (1920), 372 (the explicative note in square brackets is my own). Also in this case, I think it is possible to identify the same proverb quoted by PHerc. 409, fr. VIII Sudhaus (cf. supra). It is worth mentioning that a comparison between Demades as a symbol of φύσις and Demosthenes as an example of τέχνη can also be read, with regard to the rhetorical witticisms, in Cic., *Or.* 26,90 Westman: *E quibus tamen non omnes faceti: Lysias satis et Hyperides, Demades praeter ceteros fertur, Demosthenes minus habetur; quo quidem mihi nihil videtur urbanius sed non tam dicax fuit quam facetus; est autem illud acrioris ingenii, hoc maioris artis.*

<sup>42</sup> Special mention must also be made to Philod., *Rhet.* IV, PHerc. 1007/1673, col. XXII, 11–15 Sudhaus (I181), which belongs to Demad., fr. 28 De Falco (= Athen., III 99 Kaibel). Cf. De Falco (<sup>2</sup>1954), 29–31; Brun (2000), 131–150.

<sup>43</sup> Philod., *Rhet.* II, PHerc. 1573, fr. VIII, 1–4 Sudhaus (II, 71).

<sup>44</sup> Philod., *Rhet.* III (hypomn.), PHerc. 1506, col. 5, 10–13 Sudhaus (II, 207), quoted by De Falco (<sup>2</sup>1954), 37, in reference to the gnomological fortune of Demad., fr. 59 De Falco (= Stob., Flor. 29,91 Wachsmuth-Hense = *Anecd. gr.* IV, 253 Cramer).

There is no denying that only a new comprehensive edition of PHerc. 1004 will shed new light on the remaining obscure questions concerning this topic and help contextualize the reference to Demades' failure in PHerc. 1004's col. 76 R.-V. But this provisional collection of the extant Herculanean evidence for Demades represents a starting point for understanding the way Philodemus (or his opponents) used the example of Demades as a recurring argument within the lively debate among the Hellenistic schools on the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy.

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