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# Aristotle at the Festival:
# The Orations of Theodore the Stoudite and Byzantine Logical Culture

Abstract: Theodore plays a prominent role in studies of the "Aristotelian turn" of the second period of Iconoclasm. Scholars have shown how Theodore and Patriarch Nikephoros drew on the Aristotelian tradition to defend icon veneration, especially in polemical treatises like Theodore's *Third Antirrheticus*. This article turns to Theodore's festal homilies to show not only how they can be usefully read against the *Antirrhetici* for Theodore's Aristotelian defense of images, but also to show how Theodore's interest in the logical tradition extended beyond its application to theological polemic.

The application of Aristotelian logic to theological disputes by ninth-century iconophiles is a major theme in Byzantine intellectual history. Starting with Paul Alexander, and now especially thanks to the work of Ken Parry, Thalia Anagnostopoulos, Christophe Erismann and others, several of the main features of this trend in iconophile thought are well-known: prominent iconophiles like Patriarch Nicephorus and Theodore the Stoudite drew upon Aristotle, especially the Categories, in order to strengthen their case for the veneration of images[1]. In particular, the discussions regarding homonymy and the category of relation proved grist to the mills of Theodore and Nicephorus in their respective polemical *Antirrhetici* against iconoclasts, as well as in some of Theodore's more theological letters[2]. However, in the case of Theodore especially, his logical culture plays an important role across his writings, and is not limited to treatises and letters that are explicitly engaged in theological disputes. In what follows, I will turn to a body of texts that do not play a prominent role in scholarly narratives about the revival of Aristotelianism in this period, namely Theodore's *Orations for the great feasts of the ecclesiastical year*[3].

This study demonstrates the relevance of the Aristotelian logical tradition for Theodore's homiletics in a series of three vignettes that address three different kinds of texts from the various strata that together formed the Byzantine logical curriculum: Aristotle's *Organon* itself, the *Isagoge* or "Introduction" of Porphyry, and the Alexandrian Neoplatonic commentaries of Late Antiquity. The

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[1] Paul Alexander famously described this as the "scholastic" period of iconophile discourse: see P. ALEXANDER, The Patriarch Nicephorus: Ecclesiastical Policy and Image Worship in the Byzantine Empire. Oxford 1958, 188–189. For further discussion, see especially the following: K. PARRY, Depicting the Word: Byzantine Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries. Leiden 1996, 52–63, as well as IDEM, Aristotle and the Icon: The Use of the Categories by Byzantine Iconophile Writers, in: Aristotle's Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions, ed. S. Ebbesen – J. Marenbon – P. Thom. Copenhagen 2013, 35–58; Th. ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, Aristotle and Byzantine Iconoclasm. *GRBS* 55 (2013) 763–790, and Ch. ERISMANN, Venerating likeness: Byzantine iconophile thinkers on Aristotelian relatives and their simultaneity. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 24.3 (2016) 405–425.

[2] See, for example, the discussion of Theodore's *Letter* 492 in Ch. ERISMANN, Theodore the Studite and Photius on the Humanity of Christ. A Neglected Byzantine Discussion on Universals in the Time of Iconoclasm. *DOP* 71 (2017) 175–192, at 184; for *Letter* 528, see T. TOLLEFSEN, St Theodore the Studite's Defense of the Icons: Theology and Philosophy in Ninth-Century Byzantium. Oxford 2018, 45–46.

[3] For details and bibliography on Theodore's orations, fourteen of which have been published and two of which remain unedited, see G. FATOUROS, Theodori Studitae Epistulae I. Berlin 1992, 25*–28*; see also R. CHOLIJ, Theodore the Stoudite: the ordering of holiness. Oxford 2002, 75–76. It seems that a collection of Theodore's festal orations was made, as the Lives of Theodore refer to a πανηγυρικὴ βίβλος; see FATOUROS, Epistulae I, 23*, n. 101. For Byzantine homilies in general, see the essays collected in M. CUNNINGHAM and P. ALLEN (eds.), Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics. Leiden 1998.

first example will explore territory familiar from Theodore's theological treatises, namely his use of the *Categories* in the defense of icons, but in this case we find him invoking Aristotelian doctrine at the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross. In the second example, we move to less familiar ground, and I argue that Theodore's language for the feast of the Nativity of John the Baptist is informed by the language of the "five predicables" found in Porphyry's introduction to Aristotelian logic, the *Isagoge*. Finally, we turn to the last phase in the development of the logical curriculum: the tradition of prolegomena and commentaries on Aristotle by the Alexandrian Neoplatonists. We will trace the influence of these logical prolegomena on Theodore's homily for the feast of the Apostle Bartholomew to demonstrate the importance of these foundational texts, with their rich and rambling excursus on a variety of topics, in providing Theodore and his audience with a common store of philosophical culture. This exploration of Theodore's festal orations will highlight the importance of homilies like these for the history of intellectual culture. They do not belong to the kinds of texts that have received particular attention among students of Byzantine philosophy in accounts of the revival of Aristotelian teachings during the second period of Iconoclasm. However, homilies like Theodore's, which as liturgical texts have a public function that sets them apart from letters and treatises, offer a new window on the state of logical culture at the beginning of the ninth century.

## HOMONYMY, ARISTOTELIAN "RELATIVES" AND THE *ORATIO IN ADORATIONEM CRUCIS*

One of the more rhetorically elevated passages in Theodore the Stoudite's *Oration on the Adoration of the Cross* is a description of the general joy shared by all creation as co-celebrants of the feast:

Δοκοῦσι μοι καὶ οἶστισι μὴ αἴσθησις, συνήδεσθαι τάχα· γῆ, φημὶ, ἡ τὸν τοιοῦτον καρπὸν οἷα μήτηρ ἐκ λαγόνων δεδωκυῖα· πάντα τὰ ξύλα τοῦ δρυμοῦ ὡς ὁμωνυμίᾳ τιμώμενα· ὁ ἀειλαμπὴς ἥλιος, σελήνη ἡ πολύφωτος, ἀστέρες οἱ μαρμαίροντες, αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς ὁ μέγας οὗτος καὶ πολύστροφος· ἐπείπερ πᾶσα ἡ διὰ τοῦ σταυρικοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἄμειψις.[4]
(It seems to me that perhaps even those beings without perception share together in the joy: the earth, I declare, which like a mother has brought forth such fruit from its womb; all the trees of the forest, as if honored through homonymy; the ever-shining sun, the all-luminous moon, the shimmering stars, this great heavenly globe itself, turning and turning on end, since through the passion of the cross all creation transforms in succession for the better.[5])

The image of the "trees" (ξύλα) of the forest, honored "as if through homonymy" with the Holy Cross itself, which is sometimes referred to simply as ξύλον,[6] opens a window onto another discursive plane of Theodore's thought. Within the context of Theodore's iconophile treatises, it is again the Cross, in this case referred to by the word *stauros*, that is employed as an example to demonstrate the Aristotelian concept of homonymy, which is famously the first subject discussed in the *Categories*[7]. As mentioned above, Aristotle's treatment of homonymous terms would be one of two major doctrines from the *Categories* that came to be used by iconophiles like Theodore in order to provide philosophical support for their defense of the veneration of images. The other is the category of rela-

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[4] *In adorationem crucis* (PG 99, 693B10–C2).
[5] Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
[6] Cf. LAMPE s.v. ξύλον c.1.
[7] Aristotle, Categories (1a1–5). For Theodore's use of the Cross to demonstrate homonymy, see e.g. Antirrhetici I.8 (*PG* 337B) and II.17 (*PG* 361A) as well as TOLLEFSEN, St Theodore 122.

tion (πρός τι), and it too features in this homily, in a passage that nicely demonstrates how Aristotle could be put to use in the service of iconophile theology[8].

In the passage in question, Theodore has been constructing an analogy between Biblical types and physical images of the True Cross on the one hand, and types and images of Christ and the saints on the other, in order to strengthen the case for the veneration of icons.

Ἔν τε ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἀψύχοις ἡ χριστοειδὴς εἰκὼν τερατουργεῖν εἴωθεν ὡς ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσα τήν τε μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀρχετύπου, καὶ τοσοῦτον ταυτιζομένη τῇ τε τιμῇ καὶ προσκυνήσει, ὅσον καὶ κατὰ τοὔνομα, παντί που δῆλον. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰ καὶ παρεκβα<τ>ικώτερον[9], ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως εἰς ἔλεγχον καὶ ἀνατροπὴν τῆς εἰκονομαχικῆς αἱρέσεως, ὡς ἀνατρεπούσης τὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας Χριστοῦ μυστήριον. *ὁ γὰρ ἀναιρῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, συναναιρεῖ δηλαδὴ καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον, εἴπερ θάτερα τῶν ἅμα, καὶ τῶν πρός τι τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν.*[10]
(In the case of both animate and inanimate <types>, the image of Christ usually works miracles, as it bears within it both the shape and the appearance of its archetype, and it is to be identified with the latter both in honor and in veneration, to the degree that it is also identified with it in name, which is clear to everyone. And even if this discussion has gone on rather at length, nevertheless it is for the examination and refutation of the iconoclast heresy, as it rejects the mystery of Christ's economy. *For he who removes the image clearly also removes together with it its prototype, if indeed both belong, for those who have any sense at least, to those things which are simultaneous, and to the class of relatives.*)

Here Theodore is articulating a central thesis of what Christophe Erismann has termed "the relational explanation of images"[11]. As Erismann describes, this refers to the adaptation, developed in Late Antiquity, of the Aristotelian category of "relation" in order to explain the ontological connection between an image and its archetype: an image is an image of an archetype, and an archetype is an archetype of an image. What makes this Aristotelian category useful for the iconophiles is that Aristotle explains how relations can have or lose their existence simultaneously: to get rid of one is to get rid of the other. Thus we can compare Theodore on the image and its prototype with the following famous passage from the *Categories*:

Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστι· ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεως ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεως μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν διπλάσιον.[12]
(Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature. And in the case of most of them this is true. For double and half exist simultaneously, and if there is half then there is double, and if there is slave there is a master, and the others are similar to these. And these also remove one another from existence. For if there is no double there is no half, and if there is no half there is no double.)

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[8] For the prominent use by iconophiles of Aristotelian relatives and homonyms in the "logical turn", see Erismann, Venerating Likeness 409, with previous scholarship, as well as Idem, Nicephorus I of Constantinople, Aristotelian Logic and the Cross, in: Aristotle in Byzantium, ed. Knežević. Sebastian Press: Center for Hellenic Studies in Podgorica, *forthcoming*.

[9] PG: παρεκβαλικώτερον.

[10] *In adorationem crucis* (PG 697B10–C5).

[11] Erismann, Venerating Likeness *passim*.

[12] Aristotle, Categories (7b15–21).

This passage from the *Categories* is especially well known in studies on the use of Aristotle by iconophile thinkers during the Second Iconoclasm[13]. Together with Aristotle's discussion earlier on in the *Categories* of the concept of homonymy, the "relational explanation of images" is one of two key ideas that provide the philosophical foundation for the theological and polemical treatises of Theodore and Nicephorus, as mentioned above[14]. What is interesting about our passage, however, is the fact that this highly technical formulation of the "relational explanation of images" appears in a homily, before a monastic audience and performed in a liturgical context. Theodore himself declares that "who have any sense" would agree with his explication of the category of πρός τι, or "relation", and in doing so he constructs for himself an ideal homiletic audience that is already schooled in Aristotelian logic. That a wider monastic community should be expected to be familiar with the logical concepts alluded to by Theodore is of course not in itself surprising; the handbooks and compendia studied by Mossman Roueché for example attest to the kinds of vehicles of transmission that allowed basic logical ideas could be diffused across wide communities[15]. However, the presence of these ideas in Theodore's homilies and the public nature of homiletic performance remind us that logical culture was not limited exclusively to the classroom or theological polemic, but found a place in liturgical settings as well.

## THE NATIVITY OF JOHN THE BAPTIST AND THE PROPERTIES AND ACCIDENTS OF PERSONHOOD

We turn now to Theodore's *Oration for the Nativity of John the Baptist*, which as the Migne editor suggests may have been delivered at the behest of his uncle Plato when their monastic community was still based at Sakkoudion[16].

Theodore begins his praise of John by describing Mary's Visitation of Elizabeth. Mary, having just conceived Jesus, goes to visit her cousin Elizabeth, who herself is six months further along in her own pregnancy with John. When Mary enters the house she hails Elizabeth, and then, "when Elizabeth heard the greeting of Mary, the babe leaped in her womb; and Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit"[17]. Theodore in turn expounds upon John's miraculous ability to recognize the divinity of Christ:

> Τὴν ὁρατικὴν ἕξιν οὔπω ἐνεργῶν τὸν ἀκουστικὸν ψόφον οὔπω εἰσδεχόμενος, τὸν φωνητικὸν φθόγγον οὔπω ἐκβοῶν, τὴν περιπατητικὴν κίνησιν οὔπω μετειληφὼς, τὸ γελαστικὸν ἰδίωμα οὔπω ἐπιτετηδευκώς …[18]
>
> (His sense of sight was not yet active, nor could he yet perceive any audible noise, nor produce any voiced sound, nor did he yet partake in ambulatory movement, nor had he attained the characteristic property of laughing ...[19])

Theodore's main point here is that John, while still in the womb, was able to perceive the proximity of Christ when their pregnant mothers were visiting one another. What interests us here is the

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[13] See, for example, PARRY, Aristotle and the Icon 49, and ERISMANN, Venerating Likeness 406.

[14] See above n. 8.

[15] See, for example, M. ROUECHÉ, Byzantine Philosophical Texts of the Seventh Century. *JÖB* 23 (1974) 61–76, and IDEM, A Middle Byzantine Handbook on Logic Terminology. *JÖB* 29 (1980) 71–98.

[16] *In nativitatem praecursoris* (*PG* 99, 748–757). For the performance context, see 748C3, where Theodore says that he is delivering the oration to fulfill a πατρικὸν ἐπίταγμα.

[17] Luke 1:41. Translation taken from the Revised Standard Version.

[18] *In nativitatem praecursoris* (*PG* 99, 756 C6–10).

[19] For the phrase ὁρατικὴ ἕξις, see also Aristotle, *Categories* (12a25–12b25), a discussion of the type of opposition between "deprivation" (στέρησις) and "possession" (ἕξις), where blindness and sight are used as examples.

language he uses to refer to the ability to walk and to laugh, which John as a baby in the womb was still unable to do. The two adjectives περιπατητικός and γελαστικός, occuring as they do here in conjunction with one another and, especially, with the word ἰδίωμα (translated here as "characteristic property"), strongly suggest that they were informed by the lexicon of the logical tradition, namely discussions of definition and description as well as the five predicables of Porphyry's *Isagoge*: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. The term γελαστικός, "capable of laughter", is particularly familiar from Porphyry's *Isagoge* as an example of the strictest sense of the term ἴδιον or "property"; that is, a property that belongs always to all members of a single species and to no other[20]. Porphyry uses γελαστικόν as his example of such a property in the case of the species human, so that, to paraphrase his argument, "if it laughs it is man and if it is man it laughs". Moreover, together with "capable of laughter", Porphyry also mentions another concept that will enjoy a long history in the tradition, namely the characteristic of "walking on two feet": just a couple of lines earlier in this same discussion of the meanings of ἴδιον, Porphyry defines the second of the four meanings as that "which is an accident of all the species, even if not of it alone, as in the case of being biped of man":

Τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διαιροῦσι τετραχῶς ... καὶ ὃ παντὶ συμβέβηκεν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ μόνῳ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι ... τέταρτον δὲ ἐφ᾽ οὗ συνδράμηκεν τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν ... ταῦτα δὲ καὶ κυρίως ἴδιά φασιν, ὅτι καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ ἵππος, χρεμετιστικόν, καὶ εἰ χρεμετιστικόν, ἵππος.[21]
("Property" they divide in four ways ... [the second] is that which occurs as an accident for the entire species, even if not for it alone, as being a biped in the case of man ... The fourth is that where it occurs for the given species alone, for all of it, and for all time, as the capacity for laughter in the case of man ... And these they also call properties "in the proper sense", because they convert: for if it is a horse, it neighs, and if it neighs, it is a horse.)

The fact that Porphyry invokes in this single discussion the two properties "being capable of laughter" (τὸ γελαστικόν) and "being a biped" (τὸ εἶναι δίποδι) will lead to the lasting association of the two as standard examples later in the tradition[22]. Their association features prominently in discussions of how a "description" (ὑπογραφή) of a species differs from a "definition" (ὁρισμός) of the same species, in that the former is formed from accidents, while the latter is formed from a genus and specific differences. The employment of the examples in such a context features frequently in the prolegomena to philosophy of the Alexandrians, and especially in their commentaries on the Isagoge itself. As a representative example we can adduce the following account of description from a lemma in David's *Commentary on the Isagoge*[23]:

Ὁρισμὸς τοίνυν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὑπογραφή, καθὸ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ὑπογραφῆς δυνατὸν αἱρουμένης μιᾶς φωνῆς τὴν ὑπογραφὴν σώζεσθαι, οἷον εἰ λέγεις ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστι γελαστικὸν ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, σώζεται ἡ ὑπογραφὴ ζῷον γελαστικόν.[24]

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[20] Porphyry, Isagoge (ed. A. Busse, Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 4, 1]. Berlin 1887, 12.17–18)

[21] Porphyry, Isagoge (12.13–22 Busse).

[22] See, for example, Elias, Commentarium in Isagogen (ed. A. Busse, Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 18, 1]. Berlin 1890, 102.11–13), where the two feature as examples of how properties and differences have in common the fact that they always co-subsist with their subjects.

[23] On Porphyry, Isagoge (3.20 Busse): ἡ τοῦ γένους ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφή.

[24] David, Commentarium in Isagogen (ed. A. Busse, Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 18, 2]. Berlin, 1904, 142.12–14).

(It is a definition therefore and not a description, since in the case of a description it is possible for one of the terms to be removed and for the description to remain valid, for example if you were to say "man is an animal capable of laughter and that walks upright", the description "man is an animal capable of laughter" is still valid.)

That man can be described as an animal "capable of laughter and walking upright" also features in David's first account of the difference between definition and description, where "upright-walking" and "capable of laughter" are joined by another accident that often appears in similar contexts, πλατυώνυχον, "having wide nails":[25]

Ἔλθωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ εἴπωμεν τί διαφέρει ὁρισμὸς ὑπογραφῆς καὶ ὅρου καὶ ὑπογραφικοῦ ὁρισμοῦ ... ἡ δὲ ὑπογραφὴ ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων λαμβάνεται καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ πράγματι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ δηλοῖ, οἷον ὡς ὅταν εἴπω "ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν γελαστικὸν πλατυώνυχον".[26]
(Let us come then to the second topic, and let us say how a definition differs from a description and a term and a descriptive definition ... A description is taken from accidents and that which is incidental to the thing in question, and it indicates that which is around its nature, as in when I say "man is upright-walking, capable of laughter, and has wide nails".)

Here David refers to γελαστικόν ("capable of laughter") as a συμβεβηκός ("accident"), whereas Theodore as we saw above calls it an ἰδίωμα. This very discrepancy in usage between Theodore and David (as well as between them and Porphyry, who calls γελαστικόν an ἴδιον) itself reflects the tradition, since Porphyry's ἴδιον came quickly to be identified with συμβεβηκός[27], and we moreover occasionally find the word ἰδίωμα used interchangeably with συμβεβηκός. Thus consider the following passage, taken from another commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, in which the word ἰδίωμα is used to gloss συμβεβηκός:

τί ἐστιν ἀριθμός; συναγωγὴ ἐν οὐσίᾳ διαφόρων συμβεβηκότων ἤγουν ἰδιωμάτων ὧν τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλῳ συνδράμῃ ποτέ.[28]
(What is number? It is the collection of different accidents, that is characteristic properties, the sum of which could never occur together in anything else.)

Finally, one should note that in the passage from David's *Commentary on Porphyry* quoted above, we find the word ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, "walking upright", whereas Porphyry and Elias have δίποδι or "biped". However, it should be emphasized that David understands "walking upright" as an equivalent synonym for "biped", as he explicitly contrasts the former with "walking on four feet":

Ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε παρόντα σώζουσιν οὔτε ἀπόντα φθείρουσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· κἂν γὰρ μή ἐστιν ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ τετραποδίζει, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔχει ὄνυχας, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι.[29]

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[25]  See, for example, David, Commentarium in Isagogen (131, 2 BUSSE).
[26]  See, for example, David, Prolegomena (12, 19 BUSSE).
[27]  See J. BRUMBERG-CHAUMONT, Logico-grammatical Reflections about Individuality in Late Antiquity, in: Individuality in Late Antiquity, ed. A Torrance – J. Zachhuber. Farnham 2014, 63–90, at 76 on how Porphyry's "properties" were consistently identified with "accidents" in the subsequent tradition.
[28]  Pseudo-Elias, Prolegomena (ed. G. WESTERINK, Pseudo-Elias [Pseudo-David] Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge. Amsterdam 1967, 80.12–14). Pseudo-Elias is here echoing Porphyry's famous "bundle of accidents", see Porphyry, Isagoge (7.22–24 BUSSE).
[29]  David, Prolegomena (13.4–5 BUSSE).

(For <accidents> neither preserve <the species> man when they are present nor destroy him in their absence. For even if man were not *orthoperipatetikon* but walked on four feet, and even if he didn't have fingernails, he would no less be man.)

The property of walking on two feet, whether delineated with Theodore's περιπατητικόν, David's ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, or Porphyry's δίποδι, is a trait that is recognizable throughout the tradition as belonging to all mankind but as not defining the species. Thus to see Theodore's περιπατητικόν occur together with γελαστικόν, "capable of laughter", in a discussion of John's humanity suggests the abiding influence on Theodore of this tradition. I would finally highlight the fact that in his mini-catalogue of attributes that are characteristic of a human being, Theodore reserves for the final and climactic position the capacity for laughter, referring to it as τὸ γελαστικὸν ἰδίωμα, which is Porphyry's example of a property or ἴδιον in its fourth and most proper sense.

We find then that when Theodore's concern is to describe the basic physiological and psychological features of John's humanity, he naturally has recourse to those features—irrespective of whether they are termed "properties" or "accidents"—which the philosophical tradition singles out as paradigmatically associated with or particular to the species man.

## THE FEAST OF BARTHOLOMEW AND THE PERFECTION OF THE SIXTH APOSTLE

For our final example we turn to Theodore's homily for the feast day of Apostle Bartholomew[30]. In this case we are not interested in Theodore's application of the *Categories* to his iconophile theology, nor echoes of terminology associated with Porphyry's five predicables. Instead, in this homily we will be looking at a different moment in the Byzantine logical curriculum, in fact its very beginning. In the sequence of the course in logic established in the Neoplatonic School of late ancient Alexandria, the study of Aristotle was preceded by Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and Porphyry was himself preceded by a separate introduction, a set of prolegomena introducing both the study of philosophy and then the *Isagoge* itself[31]. Within the Byzantine tradition, the most familiar among these prolegomena are those that go under the names of David and Elias, students of Olympiodorus active in the Alexandrian school in the sixth century, which are very similar to one another in form and content, taking the form of a series of lectures[32]. Along with David and Elias, we should also include a similar and related commentary, the partially preserved set of lectures on Porphyry's *Isagoge* edited by Westerink and known as "Pseudo-Elias"[33]. Thanks to their length and their discursive, even rambling treatment of a stereotyped series of questions to be addressed before studying Porphyry, these prolegomena are a mine of information on a variety of topics related, somewhat tenuously on occasion, to logic. Furthermore, due to the fact that they constitute, as it were, the introductions to the "introduction" to the logical curriculum, that is, to Porphyry's *Isagoge*, they were able to reach an audience that included even those who had limited exposure to the philosophical curriculum, as they would have first studied prolegomena like these. In what follows we will investigate a passage in the homily for

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[30] See U. Westerbergh, Anastasius Bibliothecarius Sermo Theodori Studitae de Sancto Bartholomeo Apostolo: A Study (*Studia Latina Stockholmiensia* 9). Uppsala 1963, 41–48.

[31] Most of these Neoplatonic texts were edited in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca series. The practice of writing *prolegomena* was not limited to philosophical studies but was common across different curricula; see especially J. Mansfield, Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author or a Text. Leiden 1994.

[32] For background and bibliography on David and Elias, see Ch. Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions to Philosophy: Ammonius, David and Elias. *Hermathena* 149 (1990) 33–51.

[33] Pseudo-Elias, Prolegomena (ed. G. Westerink, Pseudo-Elias [Pseudo-David] Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge. Amsterdam 1967).

Bartholomew that demonstrates the lasting influence on Theodore exercised by these introductions to the logical curriculum.

Theodore begins the encomium by stressing the dizzying magnitude of the task ahead of him, to praise not just a saint but one of the apostles themselves. This is beyond his oratorical skill, and he dwells on the significance of the number of the apostles:

Μὴ ὅτι τῆς θείας [δυοδεκάδος] ἐστιν ὁ μεσαίτατος, καὶ τῶν φωστήρων τοῦ κόσμου ὁ διαπρύσιος; ἔστιν γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν ἡ δυοκαιδεκὰς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κιθάρας ἐναρμονίου ἐφάμιλλος, ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον ἀμφοτέρωθεν τὸν ἦχον τῆς θεολογίας ἀναπέμπουσα· εἰ βούλει δὲ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἐνιαυσιαίου κύκλου ἑκάστου μηνὸς ἐπ᾿ ἴσης τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τῷ παντὶ συνεισφέροντος, κἂν ἰδίᾳ ἕτερος ἑτέρου ποσότητί τε καὶ ποιότητι ἔχοι τὸ διάφορον.[34]
(Not to mention the fact that <Bartholomew> is centermost of the divine twelve, and that among the luminaries of the world, his brilliance is far-reaching. For the number twelve in and of itself, a rival as it were of the tuned kithara, emits from both sides an equal and similar echo of theology. Or, if you wish, as in the case of the cycle of the year, each month contributes equally its usefulness to the whole, even if one month differs from another through its particular quantity and quality.)

We then realize that Theodore's discussion of the number twelve is to prepare us for his exegesis of the position of Bartholomew in the Gospel's enumeration of the apostles. In the list given in Luke 6:13–16, Bartholomew is named sixth, a position with mystical significance (μυστικὸν θεώρημα), as Theodore explains. Bartholomew's position is "perfect":

Οὐκ ὀλιγοστὸς ἡμῖν ὁ εὐφημούμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἐπηρμένος τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος, ἔχων τι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀπαριθμήσει μυστικὸν θεώρημα κατὰ ἀριθμητικὴν μέθοδον· μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἒξ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ἀπὸ μονάδος τέλειός ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν, συμπληρούμενος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἡμίσεως μὲν τριάδος, τρίτου δὲ δυάδος, ἕκτου δὲ μονάδος.[35]
(The object of our praise is not trifling, nay indeed he is exceedingly lofty in the power of his spirit, as he possesses even in his very <place in the> enumeration a certain subject for mystical contemplation, according to the arithmetic method. For of the numbers from the monad <i.e., single digit numbers>, only the number six is perfect in its own parts[36], being completed from them, as one half <of six> is the triad, a third is the dyad, and a sixth is the monad.)

Homilists invoke ancient "arithmology" and number theory occasionally from the Late Antique period on, for example when performing exegesis on the Hexaemeron, the first Six Days of Creation, and fancy can take full flight in discussions of Pentecost, which falls seven weeks, or seven times seven days, after Pascha[37]. Here however, Theodore᾽s elaboration of the significance of the perfect number six relies, I suggest, on discussions of the number six found in the prolegomena to the philosophical curriculum and Porphyry's *Isagoge*. These excursus on number theory in the Alexandrian commentators are themselves motivated by discussions of the various definitions of philosophy, and

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[34]  In Bartholomaeum Apostolum (*PG* 99, 792B9–C2).
[35]  In Bartholomaeum Apostolum (*PG* 99, 792C3–9).
[36]  That is, what we would call the number's factors.
[37]  For early Christian interest in numbers, see J. Kalvesmaki, The Theology of Arithmetic: Number Symbolism in Platonism and Early Christianity (*Hellenic Studies* 59). Washington, DC 2013. As so often, Philo is a key figure in the transmission of these ideas to the Church Fathers; see J. Rogers, Didymus the Blind and the Alexandrian Christian Reception of Philo. Atlanta 2017, 143–154. For numerical exegesis on Pentecost, see especially Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or.* 41.2.

why it is that there are six of those definitions, a perfect number. Such passages can be found, for example, in the *Prolegomena* of both David and Elias[38]. We cite here as a representative example from Pseudo-Elias's *Prolegomena* and *Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge*:

Τούτων γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρτίων οἱ μέν εἰσι τέλειοι, οἱ δὲ ἀτελεῖς. καὶ τέλειοι λέγονται ἀριθμοὶ ὧν τὰ μέρη συντιθέμενα ἀποτελοῦσι τὸ ὅλον καὶ οὔτε ἐλλείπουσιν οὔτε πλεονάζουσιν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ ς΄· οὗτος γὰρ συντιθέμενος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον συνίστησιν, οἷον ἥμισυ ἔχει τὸ γ΄, τρίτον τὸν β΄, καὶ [ἕκτον] μονάδα, ὡς συντίθεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ γ΄ β΄ α΄ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ [ἕκτον] ἀριθμοῦ.[39]
(And of even numbers, some are perfect and others are imperfect. And numbers are said to be perfect whose parts, when added up, render the whole, and are neither deficient nor abundant, such as the number six. For this number, composed of its own parts, gives the whole. For as its half, it has the number three, as its third the number two, and as its sixth it has the number one, so that the whole of the number six is made up from the numbers three, two and one.)

We can compare the two passages to see how closely Theodore's language recalls this tradition: Theodore's phrase τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν συμπληρούμενος almost exactly reproduces the prolegomena's συντιθέμενος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι; and the way Theodore lists the factors of the number six (ἡμίσεως μὲν τριάδος, τρίτου δὲ δυάδος, ἕκτου δὲ μονάδος) closely parallels the way those same factors are listed in the prolegomena (ἥμισυ ἔχει τὸ γ΄, τρίτον τὸν β΄, καὶ [ἕκτον] μονάδα).

Further examples are available in the other *Prolegomena*. In Elias himself we find:

Θαυμάσαι δὲ ἔστιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὁρισμῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας· ἓξ γάρ εἰσιν, ὁ δὲ ἓξ τέλειος, ὡς ἴσος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι· τὰ γὰρ μέρη αὐτοῦ συνερχόμενα οὔτε πλεονάζει οὔτε ἐλλείπει. οὕτως ἥμισυ τῶν ἓξ τρία, τρίτον τῶν ἓξ δύο, ἕκτον ἡ μονάς, καὶ ἰδοὺ τέλειος· τὰ γὰρ τρία καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὸ ἓν συντεθέντα ἓξ ἀποτελεῖ μόνον.[40]
(One can also marvel at the number of the definitions of philosophy. For they are six, and six is a perfect number, as it is equal to its own parts <i.e., factors>. For its parts when they come together are neither abundant nor deficient. Thus half of six is three, a third of six is two, and a sixth is the monad, and behold, a perfect number. For three and two and one, when added together, make six only.)

Furthermore, in Elias we also learn that six "is the only number from the monad to the decade to be perfect" (ἀπὸ γὰρ μονάδος ἕως δεκάδος εἷς τέλειος ὁ ἕξ)[41]. We should compare this to how Theodore says "six is the only number from the monad to be perfect" (μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἓξ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ἀπὸ μονάδος τέλειός ἐστιν). Now, one might counter here that Theodore would have been more likely to learn arithmology or number theory in Euclid or in some other textbook of mathematics than he would in the prolegomena to philosophy. We should note, however, that Theodore's passage corresponds in its arrangement and diction to the stereotyped treatments of the Alexandrian commentaries significantly more closely than it does to the fuller discussion of the same concepts to be found in a

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[38] See David, Prolegomena (20–23 Busse), where the seventh of the ten chapters to be studied before beginning philosophy is concerned with why there are six definitions of philosophy; one of the reasons given is that six is a perfect number "because its parts add up to the whole".
[39] Pseudo-Elias, Prolegomena (8.12 Westerink).
[40] Elias, Prolegomena (24.26–31 Busse).
[41] Elias, Prolegomena (25.10–11 Busse).

mathematical treatise proper, such as that of Nicomachus of Gerasa[42]. It is the philosophical prolegomena, with their rambling explanations of how there are a perfect six definitions of philosophy, that are Theodore's more plausible inspiration for how Bartholomew, as the sixth apostle, occupies a mystically perfect position in the enumeration featured in Luke.

Theodore's discussion of six as a perfect number is a good example of how his philosophical culture seeps into his writings in various genres, and is not limited to his more explicitly theological or polemical treatises and letters. Additionally, it raises questions once again about Theodore's audience. Theodore's discussion of perfect numbers, with its fleeting mention of how in the case of the number six, "the triad, dyad and monad add up to create the whole", is brisk in its pace, and implies an audience that would not have required too much in the way of explanation. The section is difficult to follow unless one already knows that a perfect number in this case is equal to the sum of its divisors. Theodore's monastic audience at this saint's feast would likely have included others who received training in logic and philosophy, progressing at least through prolegomena after the fashion of those of the Alexandrian commentators.

This selection has highlighted moments in Theodore's homilies that reflect the different texts making up the logical curriculum, from Aristotle's *Categories* to Porphyry's *Isagoge* to the Late Antique prolegomena. Theodore's homilies let us see the influence of all these various strands of the logical tradition. Furthermore, in these texts we see the larger Aristotelian tradition working not so much as a weapon for polemic, which is the guise in which it is most familiar in studies of the philosophy of this period, but rather as a basic component of Byzantine intellectual culture as it was lived on a day-to-day basis. Whether Theodore was building arguments for theological polemic or composing homilies for the holiest days in the ecclesiastical calendar, he turned again and again to the same set of ideas and texts from the logical tradition. The fact that Theodore utilizes the same intellectual equipment for his roles as a theologian and as an orator is itself a measure of the importance of logical culture for his own self-presentation, as well as a clear if not wholly unexpected witness to the ninth-century revival of interest in the Aristotelian tradition[43].

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[42] Nicomachus' Introductio Mathematica (ed. R. Hoche, Nicomachi Geraseni Pythagorei introductionis arithmeticae libri ii. Leipzig 1866). Note especially a) that Elias and Theodore have ἀπὸ μονάδος instead of Nicomachus's ἐν μονάσι (1.16.3.8 Hoche); and b) that Nicomachus lists the factors of six in a different manner, nothing that "the number six has as its parts a half, a third, and a sixth, which are three, two, and one, which taken together add up to six", ὅ τε γὰρ ς ἔχει μέρη ἥμισυ, τρίτον, ἕκτον, ἅπερ εἰσὶ γ, β, α, ἅπερ συγκεφαλαιωθέντα ὁμοῦ καὶ γενόμενα ς ἴσα τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχει (1.16.2.7–11 Hoche); while the prolegomena, as well as Theodore, render this idea by listing in series each of the fractions into which six can be divided together with the factor that it represents. Thus compare Theodore's "one half <of six> is the triad, a third is the dyad, and a sixth is the monad" and Elias's "half of six is three, a third of six is two, and a sixth is the monad".